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INTRODUCTION
Remote, unprofitable, and filled with enemies. For the British, 
these were the terms which described the Illinois country in the years 
between the close of the Seven Years War and the outbreak of the 
American revolution. While the acquisition of the territory from the 
French in 1763 had inspired in many British minds visions of fur- 
trade wealth or new, prosperous Mississippi river colonies or at least a 
secure and stable border land between the settlements of the east and 
the enemies to the west, the Illinois country under the British regime 
never amounted to much more than a source of aggravation and 
disappointment for both the home government and the individual 
British subjects who resided or carried on business in the region. The 
territory’s settlements remained the sparsely populated, French- 
dominated backwaters that the British found upon their first arrival, 
while the British empire never saw the economic benefits expected 
from the new possession, which was thought to have been a valuable 
region for the French. Furthermore, the area in several ways 
remained hostile territory for the British. The newcomers were never 
able to reconcile all of the Illinois country's Indians to the British 
presence in the territory, and Indian violence and the threat of full 
Indian war continued to be a very real part of Illinois life throughout 
the British decade. Elements in the French population also continued 
to act in ways which undermined the authority of their old imperial 
enemies. Meanwhile, the British of their own volition weakened their
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position in the territory by reducing their m ilitary pretence. By the
beginning of the Revolution, the Illinois country's main military
installation had been dismantled, along with its supply base in#
Pennsylvania, and only a handful of British regulars stilt occupied the 
region. The plans of both imperial authorities and individual British 
subjects for the Illinois country stalled early and remained stalled, 
and, when the George Rogers Clark expedition in 1778 gave the 
territory to the rebelling colonies, there existed little to show for the 
decade of British rule.
Britain's great problem in the Illinois country was one of control. 
Different individuals discovered the root of British misfortunes in 
different places, but the fundamental condition of the regime in 
Illinois was the British inability to dominate the territory and impose 
upon it any of the several visions entertained by British subjects. 
Imperial officials could not order the Illinois country to their 
satisfaction. British traders could not control the region's commerce. 
The British military never found itself in a position whereby it could 
exert authority over the countryside. Part of this problem stemmed 
from the fact that different parties of British involved in the Illinois 
country acted according to conflicting agendas. In particular, the 
regulations established by imperial officials for trade, inspired in part 
by a mercantilist concern for making the territory profitable for the 
Empire, conflicted with the actions of individual traders searching for 
personal profit. Furthermore, although the British won the Seven 
Years War, remnants of the groups which contested for hegemony in
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the North American in te r io r-th e  French end, more importantly, the 
various Indian groups--continued to exert influence in the Itiinois 
country. In a sense, the British never completed the victory they won 
between 1734 and 1763. In the Illinois country, at least, the effort to 
secure a North American empire continued, and it was left to the next 
regime in Illinois, the American, to realise the benefits o f the British 
conquest.
This paper presents a discussion of the conditions outlined above. 
The author is concerned with detailing the complex situation whereby 
the actions of British authorities and British subjects were rendered 
ineffectual. Groups of Indians, Spanish officials, and French 
inhabitants all exerted influence in the Illinois country and receive 
treatment in the pages ahead. The paper begins with a general 
discussion of events and conditions in North America after the close of 
the Seven Years War and how they more specifically related to the 
Illinois country. It then moves on to observe in some detail the two 
most important endeavors through which the British attempted to 
dominate the territory: the trade with Indians for skins and furs, the 
Illinois country's most vital economic activity, and Indian relations in 
general.
"The Illinois country" in this paper refers not only to the area now 
known as the state of Illinois, but to the immediate region on both 
sides of the Mississippi river roughly between the mouth of the Ohio 
river and the present state of Wisconsin. As such, the Illinois country
3
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included both British Illinois and the Spanish territory to the vest o f 
the Mississippi. During the British resine, settlement in the Illinois 
country was concentrated Mi a number of villages on the Mississippi 
rives between the Mbutfca of th* Ohio « M  Kinoes rivers KaskaAtin, 
on the MMaAMppi tributary of the seme v «  me Mrgest vilM*e 
in the British territory, followed by the settlement around Port d « 
Chartres, about eighteen mites norm ef kaskaskia. In 'between M tse 
two vitiates m  the small settlement of Purie du bocher, white St. 
PhMstpe. even smaller. My to Mke norm of me fort. Cahoteia, slightly 
s m alter than the vdMge around the fort, was the Northern meet 
settlement, situated across from the mouth of the Missouri river. Not 
on the Mississippi river bet stM considered part of the Illinois 
country, Vincomes or Post St. Vincent My on the Wabash river ISO 
miles above tts confine ace with the Ohio On the Spanish side o f the 
Misstsstppi, Sat. Geacvieve was situated on the river somewhat north 
of Cnskaakta, while St. Lancs, founded in 1764 but growing rapidly 
during the years prior to the American Revolution, lay still further 
north. Just before the outbreak of the Seven Years War, the 
inhabitants ef the Illinois country numbered about 1,600, including 
slaves. 1
This paper takes as one of its main sources the records and 
correspondence left by Baynton, Wharton and Morgan, a company of 
Philadelphia merchants who invested heavily in a number of ventures 
in the Illinois country. As such, a brief word about the company's 
pursuits is in order here. Soon after the close of the Seven Years War,
: 4
Samuel Wharton, encouraged by the influential Indian agent George 
Croghan, conceived of a broad plan for his company to move quickly 
into Britain's new interior possessions and engross as much as possible 
of the Northwest s trade. Envisioning new British colonies as markets 
for company merchandise or at least expecting easy profits in the skin 
and fur trade, Baynton, Wharton and Morgan sent their first shipment 
of goods to Illinois in 1766, and later that year George Morgan, the 
company's Junior partner, took up residence in the Illinois country in 
order to oversee the company's ventures personally 2
Baynton, Wharton and Morgan hoped to find profits in four general 
ways. First, they felt they could dominate the Illinois country s skin 
and fur trade with their superior and plentiful British merchandize 
They also felt that this merchandize would allow them to control the 
trade with the territory's French inhabitants. They hoped that they 
could win a contract to supply the British garrisons stationed in 
Illinois, and, finally, they planned on supplying the imperial Indian 
administration with the goods it distributed to the Indians as 
presents.3 From the beginning of its Illinois operations, however, the 
company over-extended its capital in establishing a transportation 
system for shipping goods to the territory and in purchasing the 
goods, themselves, and the partners quickly found themselves cash- 
poor and unable to fund their debts. In the autumn of 1767, the 
company s creditors granted it three years in which to establish itself 
and find success, but none of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan's Illinois 
interests turned out to be profitable enough to sustain the business.
5
The trade with the Indian? for skins and furs and with the French 
inhabitants never lived up to the partners' sanguine expectations, 
while the company failed to secure its military supply contract, and 
the Indian administration wap forced to curtail its activities in the face 
of calls for imperial economic retrenchment. The company's last 
chance was the establishment of a new British colony in Illinois, which 
would provide many more consumers for the company's goods and 
result in a great demand for the land that George Morgan had been 
quietly accumulating. Samuel Wharton, along with many others, 
lobbied vigorously for the creation of such a colony, but the home 
government never acted upon the idea. In 1770, Morgan began 
negotiations to sell all of his company's goods remaining in Illinois to 
Moses Franks and company, Baynton, Wharton and Morgan's main 
rivals in the region, through Franks's agent William Murray. Over the 
next few years, the company worked to settle and conclude all of its 
business in the Illinois country.4
The scope of the company's activities and its presence in the 
territory throughout most of the British decade make Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan a valuable source of information. The company's 
papers record not only its own business failure, but the problems 
faced by the British, in general, in the Illinois country.
NOTH
\ m ,  )0:3-5, Aubry s account of Illinois, |763; IHC, 29|# l, 
Macarty tofcouille, February I. 1752.
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^Robert Sutton, "George Morgan, Early Illinois Businessman," 
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 69 (August, 1976), 175; 
Max Savelle, George Morgan, Colony Builder (New York, 1932), 23.
3Sutton, 177.
^Savelle, 39-52,73-74. ,
CHAPTER ONE
The British in the Illinois Country
Great Britain gained possession or the Illinois country as part of the 
settlement that ended the Seven Years' War. The Treaty of Paris, 
ratified in February, 1763, awarded to Britain all of France's North 
American territory east of the Mississippi river, with the important 
exception of the strip of land upon which New Orleans was located. 
The French ceded that city and all of their possessions west of the 
Mississippi to Spain. The Illinois Country, however, was not actually 
occupied by British troops until over two years later, when a 
detachment of about one hundred soldiers commanded by Captain 
Thomas Stirling formally relieved a small French garrison at Fort de 
Chartres near the Mississippi-river. This long delay was occasioned by 
the outbreak, in May, 1763, of the Indian war known as Pontiac's 
uprising, in which a broad confederation of northwestern Indian 
groups attempted to drive the British from the interior. Even after 
events in that war began to turn against them, many of these Indian 
groups remained reluctant to accept the withdrawl of the French and 
the new British dominance in their country. Between 1763 and 
Stirling's arrival in October, 1765, only a small handful of British 
emissaries succeeded in making the dangerous journey to Fort de 
Chartres, and even these minor successes were due 1 »e ly  to the 
efforts of French officials and army officers and, in several cases, the 
Indian leader Pontiac, who protected the British agents from Indian
8
9attack. In the summer or 1765. the Indian trader turned Indian agent 
George Croghan negotiated a general peace with most of the western 
groups, and this settlement opened the way for Stirling's mission, 
which represented the final defeat and fragmentation of the Indian 
confederacy and the occupation of the last French posts in the ceded 
territory. 1
In so far as the British now occupied all of their newly won 
possessions. Britain's victory in North America had been fully realized. 
The suppression of the Indian uprising, however, did not mark the 
end of Britain's troubles in the west. The British now needed to 
control and manage the interior in such a way that British subjects 
and the British empire would benefit from the war-time acquisitions, 
and this proved to be a very difficult task. By the time Stirling made 
his mission to Fort de Chartres, the home government and imperial 
officials had erected a system of management for the new possessions 
based upon the goals of gaining profits for the Empire from trade in 
the interior and keeping the new territories peaceful and secure by 
avoiding disruptions with the Indians. The system, however, quickly 
proved unable to meet these goals, rather it created a number of 
contentious issues between interior inhabitants and imperial 
authorities. The question of how best to manage and use the western 
territories plagued the British government and British subjects 
throughout the years prior to the outbreak of the American 
Revolution.
t
The imperial plan for the management of the North American interior 
was based upon three general policies. First, a sizeable force 
of regular British troops was to be kept garrisoned in the new 
territories to ensure the functioning of imperial authority. In part, 
this policy represented a reaction to problems British authorities 
experienced in prosecuting the Seven Years War. During the war, the 
home government called upon the several colonies to contribute to the 
North American war effort. The British army requisitioned men, 
money and supplies from the colonial legislatures and administrations. 
For imperial authorities, this system proved unwieldy and inefficient. 
The home government frequently experienced trouble raising money 
for the war effort from the colonies, and the colonial legislatures 
sometimes balked at providing troops for military actions which they 
considered unimportant to their own colonies' interests. As British 
victories in North America removed the immediate danger of enemy 
attack, some colonies began to cut back on their contributions, despite 
the responsibilities involved in occupying vast quantities of newly 
captured territory. The difficulties created by the war-time 
requisition system convinced the home government and the leaders of 
the army, at the war's conclusion, that the North American interior 
needed a defense establishment which would not have to depend 
upon the cooperation of thtf colonial legislatures. To this end, the 
North American Commander-in-Chief, General Jeffrey Amhearst, 
divided the interior into a number of military districts and worked to 
establish a series of forts garrisoned with British regular troops.
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Imperial authorities, alone, controlled and were responsible for these 
garrisons. Pontiac's uprising disrupted Amhearst's effort, but the 
home government ordered Amhearst's successor, General Thomas 
Gage, to maintain the form of Amhearst's plan once the forts could be 
reoccupied.2 Captain Stirling's occupation of Fort de Chartres marked 
the completion of this plan.
The restriction of colonial expansion into the West formed the 
second element of the home government's system of management for 
the new British possessions. The Proclamation of 1763 ordered that 
private land acquisitions west of a line drawn down the crest of the 
Appalachian mountains be prohibited without royal approval. The 
new territories, at least for the present, would be left for the Indians 
and the merchants with whom they traded. This policy reflected the 
need for the British to maintain good relations with the western 
Indians, whose resentment over white encroachments upon their 
lands had threatened British war-time alliances and had contributed 
to the outbreak of Pontiac's uprising. The stability of the North 
American interior depended upon the Indians' being reconciled to the 
British presence, so any expansion west of the established colonies 
demanded extreme caution to avoid alienating Indian groups.3 The 
policy also served to consign the territories to the traders who dealt 
with Indians for skins and furs, commodities expected to provide 
British subjects and the British empire with great wealth. Towards 
these ends, the home government sealed off. at least temporarily, 
territories like the Illinois country from large-scale British settlement.
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Finally, the general system for the management of the West 
provided for the centralized regulation of Indian affairs and the trade 
between whites and Indians for skins and furs, which formed the 
interior's most lucrative commercial pursuit. Like the restriction on 
interior settlement, this policy grew out of the two goals of making the 
interior a source of profit for the Empire and maintaining peaceful 
relations with the western Indians. During the last years of the war 
with France, the British Indian superintendent for the northern 
district, Sir William Johnson, frequently pointed out the close 
connection between trade and the maintenance of the British Indian 
alliances. Johnson felt that properly regulated trade could win over to 
the British side the Indian groups who were yet favorable towards the 
French. In 1761, he drew up a list of regulations for a number of 
western forts that the army had recently opened up for the Indian 
trade. All trading was to take place at the forts, themselves, and all 
traders were required to possess a royal license. The commanders of 
the various posts, in turn, were charged with overseeing the trade and 
making certain that the Indians were treated fairly.4 These 
regulations eventually formed the nucleus of the Board of Trade s 
official post-war plan for the regulation of Indian affairs, issued in 
July, 1764. In this plan, the imperial government assumed full control 
over the regulation of the Indian trade. The Board reaffirmed the 
offices of two superintendents, one each for northern and southern 
districts, and it charged these superintendents with setting up 
subordinate agents, or commissaries, at the posts in their respective
jurisdictions. The Board restricted trading to the posts, where the
commissaries could observe*it, but it offered to license any British
subject who wanted to engage in the trade. The plan prohibited
*
trading in alcohol and reiterated the injunction against the acquisition 
of Indian lands without imperial permission and oversight. Finally, 
the Board proposed that a new tax on the proceeds of the trade be 
levied to meet the expenses of the program.5 This plan, since it 
involved the creation of a new tax, required that Parliament take 
action upon it. This was never done, but the Borad of Trade instructed 
William Johnson and John Stuart, reconfirmed in their positions as 
superintendents of the northern and southern districts respectively, to 
carry out the details of the program to the greatest extent possible.6 
Here, then, were the policies with which the British imperial 
authorities attempted to manage the Illinois country after 1763. 
Under this program, Illinois was to serve two functions. It would 
provide an area in which skin and fur traders could operate, and it 
would be preserved, at least for the time being, as Indian country. 
The restriction on settlement would allow the British to avoid the 
alienation of Indian groups produced by while encroachments on 
Indian land, while it would leave the territory open for the endeavors 
of traders, whose activities were expected to result in great profits for 
the Empire. Similarly, the trade regulations established in 1764 would 
allow British officials to oversee the commerce so as to ensure that 
traders, on one hand, did nothing to anger the Indians who came to 
them with pelts and, on the other, that they carried on their business
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in ways which kept the region's skins and furs flowing to Britain. This 
second consideration was of particular importance in British Illinois, 
since the territory lay on the boundary with Spanish lands. With 
Spanish villages just across the Mississippi river and with the river, 
itself, providing a means of passage to Spanish New Orleans, the 
location of British Illinois offered traders the opportunity of selling 
their pelts, if economically expedient, to Great Britain's commercial 
and political rivals. The imperial program applied to territories like 
the Illinois country, then, combined a mercantilist concern for making 
the interior profitable to the Empire with the practical necessity of 
keeping groups of interior Indians well-disposed towards the British.
In all three elements of the program, Illinois confronted the British 
with problems. Many British who arrived soon after occupation, for 
instance, felt that the military presence in the territory was too small. 
Although Croghan had negotiated peace with the various Indian 
groups and the last remnants of the French military had withdrawn, 
the British remained in an insecure position in Illinois. British officers 
and traders felt threatened by the presence of French inhabitants both 
in British territory and across the Mississippi river. They believed 
that French traders, hoping to retain their commercial dominance in 
the area, had been responsible for inciting the Indians' resistance to 
occupation. Lieutenant John Ross, one of the emissaries who had 
reached Fort de Chartres prior to Stirling s mission, had witnessed 
French traders urging Indians to continue the war against the British7 
Similarly, a group of Illinois Indians had told Croghan in the summer
I f
of 1745 that the French had wanted dam of a British plan m  steal the 
Illinois land end f iv e  it as the Cherokee, a group allied trice Britain.8 
Jest prior to British occupation, a number of French Merchants haul 
withdrawn from Illinois to the west side of the Mississippi river, aatd 
it was believed that they meant to keep the trade to themselves and 
encourage the Indians to break the peace settlement.^ Late in 1765. 
William Johnson reported to-the Lords of Trade that these Frenchmen 
were, in fact, trading extensively in British territory mad that they 
were doing so with the help of their co-nationals still residing to the 
east of the Mississippi * 0 With such enemies thought to be lurking 
about, many British felt that the Illinois country required a stronger 
military presence. Croghan and General Gage favored the construction 
of a new fort on the Mississippi at the mouth of the Illinois river. This 
hew post would seal off the illegal traders' main highway into British 
territory.* * Of course, during this time, illegal trade was also carried 
on between the French on the west side of the Mississippi and British 
traders to the east, and a new fort would have intercepted some of 
this commerce, as well.*2 British authorities, however, did little to 
increase their military strength in the region. The garrison at Fort de 
Chartres was reinforced in 1765, but the British never built the 
proposed fort or took any other significant measure to strengthen 
their military presence in the Illinois country. * 3
The second element in the plan for managing the West, the 
restriction of land acquisitions west of the proclamation line, also 
proved a source of trouble in Illinois, since the British occupation
inspired in some visions of a new colony. In 1763, even before the 
Illinois country was in British possession, a group of Virginia and 
Maryland landlords formed the Mississippi Company and drafted a 
memorial requesting a two and one half million acre land grant at the 
confluence of the Mississippi and Ohio rivers. They stressed to the 
home government the benefits a new colony would provide in the 
defense of the West and as a market for British manufactured goods. 
The Proclamation of 1763 and the accompanying ministerial 
opposition to western settlement, however, led them to set aside their 
plans. 14 Similarly, General Gage desired the creation of a small 
military colony around the Fort de Chartres, with tracts of land to be 
granted in return for military service or other obligations to the 
Crown. Gage believed that the 17th century French had arrived In 
Illinois before the Indians, who only later had fled to the French 
territory from marauding Iroquois to the east. Thus, Gage believed 
that the British, as conquerers of the French, had prior claim to the 
French lands and could settle them without injustice to the In dia ns.  15 
The home government did not act upon Gage s suggestion, but 1766 
saw a similar plan surface with the organization of the Illinois 
Company, whose membership included Governer William Franklin of 
New Jersey, Sir Williau Johnson, George Croghan, and the trading 
partners John Baynton, Samuel Wharton, and George Morgan.16 These 
men hoped to create a colony out of lands purchased from French 
inhabitants in Illinois. With the help of Benjamin Franklin in London, 
they set out to lobby vigorously the home government on behalf of
16
their plan. They came near to success in 1767, when Lord Shelburne. 
Secretary of State for the Southern Department, adopted their plan as 
part of a larger revision of imperial policy, but a reorganization of the 
cabinet which took Shelburne out of power and an accompanying shift 
in policy sidetracked the Illinois Company's plan, and it was later 
superseded by the cairoaign of many of the same men to secure a 
land grant for a colony in the Ohio valley. 1? Although none of the 
various plans for colonizing the Illinois country succeeded prior to the 
Revolution, the desire on the part of British Illinois inhabitants for 
land and new settlement formed a great point of contention with 
imperial authorities throughout the British period.
The third element of the imperial system of management, the 
regulation of Indian affairs and the Indian trade, provided British 
authorities and traders in Illinois with the greatest amount of trouble. 
Indeed, Indian and trade issues often fueled the demands already 
described for a stronger military presence and for more extensive 
settlement. As already suggested, both security and successful 
commerce demanded that British officials and traders maintain 
friendly relations with at least some of the region s Indian groups. 
Such amity would encourage Indians to trade their furs and skins with 
licensed traders at the posts, rather than with illegal traders in the 
interior or with the French to the west of the Mississippi. The 
products of this illegal trade generally did not go to British ports, but 
rather flowed through New Orleans to France or Spain. *8 Likewise, a 
healthy, equitable commerce between Indians and British traders
17
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would encourage peaceful relations between the Indian groups and 
the British, in general, and, as such, help maintain the security of the 
western territories.^
In addition to fair trade, the distribution of presents to the Indians 
was necessary if good relations were to be maintained. Croghan stated 
in 1764:
The Expense of giving favours to the many additional Tribes 
of Indians as are now in alliance with Great Britain since the 
Reduction of Canada must be considerable, but I dare say, 
it will be found the cheapest and best method in the End to 
cultivate a friendship with them in this manner.20
Typical Indian presents included metal goods like knives and kettles,
guns and ammunition to aid in hunting and war. and textile goods like
blankets and clothing. The French had long benefited from this
practice of gift-giving, and during the Seven Years' War British
officials likewise had used gift-distribution in making and maintaining
Indian alliances/21 When the British arrived in Illinois, Indian parties
began to come to them asking for presents.22 Indian trade, Indian
alliances, and Indian presents- were inextricably bound together.
In 1766, Croghan came to the Illinois country and negotiated at 
Fort de Chartres a second treaty with most of the western Indian 
groups.23 The same year, William Johnson sent Edward Cole to 
Illinois as Indian commissary. Cole immediately began to distribute 
Indian presents, most of his merchandize being purchased from 
George Morgan, at such a rat* that the Crown owed Baynton, Wharton 
and Morgan over i  1,500 New York currency (about 1900 sterling) 
within three months. While much of this outlay was related to
19
Croghan's large peace conference, General Gage was stunned by the 
magnitude of Cole's purchases and estimated a L I 0,000 New York 
(about L6.000 sterling) bill for a full year's gift-giving.24 jn 
defending his actions, Cole stated that disreputable French traders 
were trafficking goods in British Illinois at very low prices in the hope 
of damaging the British Indian alliances. He told Johnson, "the Country 
must either be kept by force of Arms, or by being on good terms with 
the Indians, which latter cannot be done without Expense," and he 
pointed out that many Indians would be returning to him in the 
Spring, when he would be forced to distribute more presents. In the 
same letter, Cole admitted having allowed a number of traders, both 
British and Illinois French, to visit and winter in Indian villages. This 
action directly violated the 1764 plan, but Cole asserted that if these 
traders were forced to wait for the Indians to come to the posts with 
their skins and furs, "the other side of the River would take all the
Trade."25
Here was a clear statement of the British predicament in Illinois. 
The imperial program, aimed at avoiding disruptions with the Indians 
and ensuring that the profits of the trade flowed to Great Britain, 
required that trade be carried on at the posts under the eyes of British 
officials. Yet if traders stayed within these imperial regulations, they 
might never win the trade, and the Indian friendship which came with 
the trade, in the first place. The British military presence in Illinois 
was never large enough to enforce uniform obedience to the
4
regulations, and, as long as significant numbers of traders still carried
20
on their business away from British officials, a great many Indians 
would never trade at the posts and the expected benefits of the post- 
only rule could not be realized. Similarly, while security and trade in 
the Illinois country demanded that the British authorities establish 
and maintain Indian alliances, the price of these alliances in presents 
threatened to be more than the Illinois country was worth. As time 
went on, Cole continued to distribute large amounts of merchandize, 
and at one point General Gage refused to honor the bills Cole drew 
upon him for Baynton, Wharton and Morgan.26
Cole's problems in Illinois were part of a larger set of difficulties 
confronting the British in the West, as a whole. Put simply, the system 
of careful, central regulation erected after the war failed on almost all 
points. British hunters and farmers, for instance, violated the 
restriction on settlement and took lands west of the line laid down in 
the Proclamation of 1763. Attempts were made to evict some of these 
settlers, but with only minor success. The colonial administrations on 
the east coast did little to enforce the ban on unauthorized 
settlements, and General Gage suspected that some colonial leaders 
actually aided the squatters.
The regulation of Indian trade and affairs met with even less 
success. Traders disliked being confined to the posts, and French 
traders from across the Mississippi continued to invade British 
territory to do business with the Indians at their villages. Traders in 
British possessions defied the 1764 regulations by purchasing their 
pelts outside of the posts--sometimes with the sanction of colonial
21
authorities, as when Guy Carleton, the governor of Canada, issued 
licenses authorizing traders to deal with Indians at their villages. The 
skins and furs purchased outside of the posts often were not 
transported to British markets, but rather went through New Orleans 
to France or Spain. Johnson's commissaries, for their part, worked to 
maintain Indian alliances through gift-giving and, in the process, 
elicited complaints from imperial officials who found their generosity
too great.27
The home government s difficulties in raising North American 
revenue, meanwhile, greatly exacerbated western problems. The 
violations of imperial policy just mentioned, if anything, demanded 
increased expenditures for such projects as evicting squatters and 
building forts to intercept the illegal trade. In the years following the 
repeal of the Stamp Act, however, retrenchment was the message that 
issued from the home government. Furthermore, unrest in the 
eastern colonies came to overshadow the need to maintain stability 
and strength in the West, since the revenue necessary to meet the 
home government s original western goals could not be raised without 
inciting resistance in the colonies.2 8 to  escape this trap, the home 
government in 1768 revised its policies. In March of that year, the 
Lords of Trade issued a report recommending that the regulation of 
Indian trade be returned to the several colonies to do with as they 
saw fit. The Lords suggested that the Indian superintendents be 
retained to provide the Indians with someone to whom they could 
take their complaints but stipulated that the superintendents should
t
be kept to a strict budget and made to limit Indian presents. They 
rejected the idea of new western colonies but recommended that a 
new Indian boundary west of the proclamation line be negotiated to 
allow for some colonial expansion.29 Based upon these 
recommendations, the ministry several weeks later approved a new 
policy aimed at reducing imperial expenses by relinquishing 
responsibility for the Indian trade and by allowing the military to 
evacuate some of the western garrisons. The home government also 
hoped it would be able to control eastern colonists more effectively by 
permitting some expansion while strictly enforcing the new Indian 
boundary.30
In Illinois, this policy change meant that Edward Cole lost his 
position as commissary and distributor of Indian presents and that 
land speculators began to lose interest in the restricted Illinois 
country and turn their attention to the territory opened up to the east. 
Furthermore, the change eliminated the prospects for an increased 
military presence in Illinois, and General Gage even suggested that the 
army withdraw from the territory completely.3 1 In several ways, 
however, the situation in Illinois after 1768 remained the same 
before. Lieutenant Colonel J|>hn Wilkins, the new commander at Fort 
de Chartres, continued the practice of trying to manage the Indians 
with presents, although, having been ordered by Gage to reduce 
expenses, Wilkins' presents were not so large or frequent as Cole's. 
Wilkins' gifts often consisted of little more than large amounts of 
inexpensive alcohol, which allowed the commander to act generously
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without spending too much of the Crown s money.32 Wilkins and 
other Illinois British also continued to clamor for a strengthening of 
the territory's military. As late as 1769, Wilkins wrote to cabinet- 
member Lord Barrington in support of the idea of a new fort at the 
mouth of the Illinois river. He further suggested that new posts be 
built on the Wabash and Ohio rivers. Wilkins estimated that, with 
these new installations, 3,300 packs of peltry worth L53.900 sterling 
would be taken each year, some of these skins and furs coming from 
the Indians of the Spanish.territory, who would be drawn to the
i
British by the new posts.33 Finally, the ministry s attitude against the 
creation of new interior colonies did not stop some Illinois British from 
speculating in lands. In 1768, George Morgan began to buy parcels of 
land from French inhabitants, and the next year Wilkins made land 
grants to Morgan, his partners, and several other men. Wilkins 
retained a one-sixth interest in these grants. General Gage, however, 
later refused to confirm them,34
A more serious challenge to imperial policy came several years 
later from Illinois merchant William Murray. On the basis of the 
York-Campden legal opinion, which slated that British subjects did not 
need royal approbation in purchasing land from natives in India, 
Murray helped to organize a new Illinois Land Company in early 1773. 
Believing that a contract with an Indian group was enough to validate 
a land purchase, Murray privately negotiated to buy land from the 
Indians living between the Wabash and Illinois rivet s. Captain Hugh 
Lord, then commander in Illinois, told Murray he would not be
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allowed to settle his lands and informed General Frederick haldimand. 
tne acting Commander in-Chief in North America, of Murray's actions. 
In March of 1774, Haldimand issued a proclamation forbiding the 
private purchase of land from Indians and instructed Lord to declare 
Murray's deeds invalid. The Illinois Company, however, continued to 
work to secure Murray's purchases 35
The Illinois Company's illegal land speculation was indicative of the 
continued failure of imperial policy, in general The home government 
had designed the 1768 changes to accommodate the eastern colonists 
opposition to an American revenue and their desire for land, while 
maintaining western security and peace with the Indians. Yet, by the 
early 1770s, the situation in the West had not improved. First, the 
maintenance of garrisons continued to be too expensive for the home 
government, and, in late 1771, the ministry acted upon Gage's earlier 
suggestion and ordered the destruction of Fort de Chartres and its 
supply base Fort Pitt and the withdrawl of the soldiers stationed at 
those posts. Fifty men under Captain Lord were left in Kaskaskia at a 
post called Fort Gage to govern and maintain the security of the 
immediate area.36 Second, the colonial legislatures failed to establish 
effective regulations for the Indian trade once responsibility for the 
trade returned to them. Attempts were made to hold an inter-colonial 
conference to discuss a general plan, but colonial indifference and 
reluctance on the part of the home government to allow a potentially 
rebellious meeting to take place kept such a conference from 
materializing. Individual colonial legislatures, meanwhile, balked at
erecting rules which might have rendered their merchants less 
competitive than those of other colonies, while the commanders of 
interior posts claimed that they lacked the means with which to 
control the traders. The result of all of this was chaos in the trade and 
frequent Indian complaints of cheating and abuse.37
With continued British encroachments upon Indian lands and the 
abuses of British traders came Indian attacks and rumors of a coming 
frontier war Id early |77|, word came that certain Shawnee and 
pelaware were th ing to form a new confederation of northwestern 
Indian* with w hich to attack the hritl«h in the Meat M M * region and 
Minot* ** later that year, Page reported that the Indian* of eleven 
village* around the Waba*h river and lake Michigan were set to fait 
Upon the Illinois country and to cut oil passage down the Ohio river ^  
These expected attack* did not materiatUm, hut in l? 7 f  an Indian war 
finally did break out between group* of Hhawneu and Virginians led 
by Oovernur lord punmore over while encroachments upon ‘ -hawnee 
lands in Kentucky and the murder of a number of Shawnee by
i
Virginia frontiersmen Lord Punmore s War. however, remained 
isolated to these two antagonist*, a new Indian confederation Having 
failed to materialize. Alone, the Shawnee were quickly defeated and 
forced to recognize the Virginians claims to Kentucky lands 40
Just prior to the outbreak of Lord Pubeture* War. the home 
government shifted western policy for a second and final time with 
the passage of the Quebec Vet, which extended the boundaries of 
Quebec to include most of the interior east and north of the Mississippi
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and Ohio rivers. This had the effect of once again taking control over 
Indian affairs away from the eastern colonies. Unlike the easterners, 
the Canadians and Governor Guy Carleton had exhibited skill in 
dealing peacefully with the Indians, and it was hoped that Canadian 
management could return peace to the interior and reduce the flow of 
pelts from British territory to New Orleans. The Quebec Act was also 
meant to maintain the security of the interior following the withdraw! 
of much of the British military. With only a minimal armed presence 
in the West, it was now important that the French living in British 
territory be kept loyal. The act attempted to secure this loyalty by 
giving the French inhabitants civil government, providing for the 
toleration of Catholicism, and establishing a body of law based upon 
French, as well as British, traditions. Finally, the act was aimed at 
preventing land speculation like that of William Murray by giving the 
interior to a colony concerned primarily with the fur trade and by 
securing French culture and law. which would discourage British 
settlement.^ 1 By 177•!, then, the Illinois country had been largely 
abandoned by the British military and placed under a semi-French 
administration. The various schemes by British nationals to acquire 
and exploit Illinois lands had failed, and the commerce in pelts still 
was dominated by French traders. For a brief time before the 
American Revolution changed everything, it must have seemed in the 
Illinois country that the war for empire had been won by the French.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Spanish
For the British in the Illinois country, life was continually being 
complicated by the presence of rival Europeans just across the 
Mississippi river. British traders, Uif instance saw lb* Spanish 
territory as a refuge for lawfe*? frerutt merchant* who in-ygded 
British lands to steal the commerce in spin? an4 fu*-? from its prop#/ 
practitioners. In tb//jf ftr itifl relations Ktitfth authorities bad to he 
concerned not onjy wdh stability and peace m the region,
i
but with securing allies m the even! of an Anglo Spanish war Spanish 
villages gave trftferr option of sending their pelts out of hritish 
territory, an action wh#£b -viofafed impest*1 regulaipin*, while Spanish 
Indian presents could undermine the efforts of British officials to 
reduce their own gift giving hy providing Indian groups with the 
option of seeking goods across the river The fact that British Illinois 
lay on an international boundary, theft, exerted considerable influence 
over British actions and policies
Like Great Britain, Spain after she Seven Years War found itself in 
possession of vast new North American territory By the first Treaty 
of Ildefonso, in 1762, and the T re e *  df Paris the next year. France 
ceded to Spain the city of New Orleans and the French possessions 
west of the Mt*si»s*ppi river, mctedin* the small enclave anroes the
river from what was now British Whims Thus, a new military and
0
political frontier came into being between Britain and Spain, with
considerable strategic importance Tailing to the remote and sparsely 
populated territories of British and Spanish Illinois. Prior to the late 
1750s, French success and expansion on the plains and in the 
Mississippi valley had kept the Spanish bottled up in New Mexico, and 
the suddenness of the territorial reallignment left the Spanish groping 
for proper policies with which to manage the interior.1
The Spaniards initial goals for the Illinois country were very 
similar to those of the British across the river Spain needed to 
exercise military control over the new territory, establish and 
maintain alliances with the various Indian groups, and regulate trade 
so as to secure profit for the* Spanish empire and avoid angering the 
Indians. In early 1767, the Spanish governor in New Orleans, Don 
Antonio de Ulioa, ordered the construction of forts on either side of 
the Missouri river near its confluence with the Mississippi. Ulioa 
believed that the British had penetrated Spanish territory by way of 
the unguarded river and were trying to ally themselves with the 
Indians of the adjacent area so as to be able to claim a right to the 
Missouri river later on. Also, Ulioa expected that Spain and Britain 
soon would be coming to some manner of open conflict, and he wanted 
the Spanish to be better able t® defend their new possession? The 
lowness of the land at the mouth of the Missouri and its propensity to 
flood with the spring freshets led Illinois Commandant Franc two Kaa to 
modify Ulioa s instructions and construct a tort named Don Carlo* et 
Senor Principe de Asturias oe the south bank and only a ama!
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blockhouse, Don Carlos Tercero el Rey, on the north. The Spanish had 
completed and occupied these poiis by early 1769.3
The Spanish, needed to do more than build new military 
installations. It was vital that the new overlords gain and hold the 
friendship of the territory's Indians. Many experts, however, believed 
that this would prove a difficult task for the Spanish. In 1765. Charles 
Phillippe Aubry, the French governor waiting in New Orleans to hand 
over Louisiana to the Spanish, wrote. All the nations of this continent 
know by hearsay about the cruelties which the Spaniards have 
practiced elsewhere in America and detest them generally. The 
Spanish were known for forcing the Indians of their territories to 
convert to Catholicism and fqr the harsh punishments they meted out 
to Indians who defied their will. Aubry predicted that such practices, 
if used in Louisiana, would drive Indian groups to the BrMsh. British 
officials, for their part, felt greatly relieved by news 61 the cession of 
Louisiana to Spain. They supposed that the Spanish woy>W not be able 
to construct a set of Indian alliances capable of threatening British 
possessions.4 The Spanish, however, proved to be more flexible in 
Indian affairs than expected. Governor Ulloa s instructions on the
treatment of Indians in Illinois displayed an acute consciousness of
i
the need to maintain friendly relations. In what concerns the 
Savages, he wrote, what they require is that they be treated as 
brothers, and that not the slightest affront, jest, or mockery be shown 
them." Ulloa advised the'Illinois commandant not to carry out 
retribution for the Indians' offenses, but rather to complain to the
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chiefs of the offending men. Furthermore, he suggested that nothing 
be done to contradict the Indians' belief that they held complete 
dominion over the land and merely suffered the Europeans to come 
among them.5 In addition to this sort of respect and friendliness, the 
commandants of Spanish Illinois endeavored to mediate between 
warring Indian groups, and they continued their French predecessors 
practice of distributing presehts 6 In this latter operation, the Spanish 
were generous enough that some Indians scorned the gifts of the 
British as stingy in comparison, and the British began to suspect • 
Spanish plot aimed at setting the Indians against us 7 During the 
tenure of Governor Alejandro 0 Reilly. Spanish officials made a 
contract with the New Orleans firm of Maxent and Hanson to provide a 
regular supply of Indian presents for Spanish Illinois. In 1769, 
OReilly declared that the cost of Spanish gift distribution was 
reasonable and justified, and he expressed his general satisfaction 
with the tenor of Indian affairs 8 The Spanish in Illinois, than, 
abandoned the harsh practices they had employed elsewhere in 
America and adopted policies aimed at securing Indian alliances 
through accomodation. They encountered difficulties, of course. 
Outbreaks of Indian violence against the white inhabitants of Spanish 
Illinois occurred, and several Indian groups remained hoatile to these 
inhabitants throughout the period considered here 9 The predictions 
that Spanish brutality and ineptitude would drive Indian groups to 
the British, however, did not come true. Rather, the Spanish presented
f
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competition to British authorities in their efforts to secure Indian 
alliances
Like the British who formulated the imperial program for the 
interior, Spanish officials worked to ensure that the skin and fur trade 
in the Illinois country would prove a source of profit for the Spanish 
empire §u tht? pursuit the Spanish possessed an asset in that, by the 
time Spanish troops occup*ed the territory many of the Illinois 
country's most able traders had left British Illinois to settle on the 
west side of the Mississippi St. Louts or Paincourt, was established in 
1764 around a traatifl* post owned bv the merchant Pierre Laclede by 
Illinois French not wishing to become British subjects '  ^ in 1766, 
British Captain Henry Gordon visited (he town and found it thriving, 
and he suggested tha. British traders had reason to fear Laclede and 
the other Patncourt merchants, whom he believed to be working to 
engroas the British territory's trade • 1 Some French migration west 
continued throughout the period of British rule, in part due to the 
inhabitants dissatisfaction with their treatment under the British 
commanders *2 The Spanish, then, benefited in Illinois from a 
population which was hostile to th< British and which included men 
who could be expected to reap the full rewards of the Indian trade.
Soon after occupying the territory, Spanish officials set up trade 
regulations designed to ensure profits for the Empire and the good 
treatment of Indians. In 1767, Governor Ulloa ordered that all traders 
be licensed and that the prices of skins and furs be agreed upon and 
set. He instructed that all traders boats should be made to dock at
3 4
one or the settlements, so that Spanish officials would be able to 
oversee the territory's commerce. Ulloa also ordered that no alcohol 
be sold to the Indians, nor firearms to those not already familiar with 
them .13 Almost immediately, however, the Spanish officials 
experienced difficulties in the form of illegal commerce between 
traders from the Spanish and British territories. For the Spanish 
empire, French migration to St. Louis possessed a negative aspect. 
Many traders retained commercial ties with merchants still living on 
British land, and these relationships allowed trade to be carried on 
across the Mississippi boundary, an illegal practice which angered 
British officials and took some of th^ proceeds of the trade out of 
Spanish territory, where it could not profit the Empire.*4 The close 
proximity of St. Louis to Cahokia and Ste. Genevieve to Kaskaskia and 
the existence of ferries across the Mississippi dating from when both 
sections of the Illinois country had been French made carrying on this 
illegal commerce easy.1 5 in 1768, partly in response to a British 
request, Ulloa issued a proclamation forbidding traders from Spanish 
territory from crossing the Mississippi and threatening those who did 
with expulsion. *6 The Spanish were troubled also by the 
encroachments of traders from east of the Mississippi into Spanish 
territory, in particular the area around the Missouri river. In 1769, 
Commandant Riu proclaimed that traders from British territory would 
not be tolerated on the Missouri and ordered that all merchants 
legally going to that river first be approved by himself.1?
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Over time. Spanish success in the Illinois country proved very 
limited. By 1778. the posts built on the Missouri river stood in 
disrepair and were occupied by only a handful of soldiers, and the 
commandant felt that a new fort had to be constructed. Similarly, the 
trade regulations did not eliminate the illegal commerce which drew 
wealth out of the Spanish empire. Traders from the British territory 
continued to operate in Spanish Illinois, while trade was carried on 
across the Mississippi's international boundary. The commandant in 
1778 feared that illegal traders in the territory might damage the 
Spanish Indian alliances.18 Furthermore, there were signs that the fur 
and skin trade, itself, was slackening.19 The Spanish, then, never fully 
achieved their goals for the Illinois country.
The history of the Spanish regiir.' in Illinois appears similar to that 
of the British across the river, but. although the two groups 
experienced like disappointments, the Illinois country never gave the 
Spanish the degree of trouble it did the British. The Spanish, for 
example, never had to effect the kind of abrupt policy shifts carried 
out by the British in 1768 and 1774. One reason for this was that the 
Spanish, even with their commercial regulations, did not try to restrict 
the traders as severely as did the British. Officials like William 
Johnson felt that British traders and the French inhabitants in British 
territory could not be trusted to deal with the Indians without 
imperial supervision, so they tried to limit trade to the posts. The 
Spanish never erected such a rule. and. for the most part, they left 
their French subjects and the Spanish who came to the region free to
conduct their business as they saw fit. The Spanish policy demanded 
less government oversight and expense than the British plan and. as 
such, elicited fewer complaints and violations. More importantly, the 
Spanish officials never had to contend with the sort of political turmoil 
seen in the British Atlantic colonies, although there did occur a short­
lived revolt of French inhabitants of Spanish Louisiana, and they 
never faced a movement aimed at establishing new interior 
settlements contrary to imperial policy. Not having to constantly fight 
its own people. Spain could concentrate on its original objectives of 
making and keeping Indian alliances and profiting through the trade. 
In this way, the history of the Spanish regime in the Illinois country 
sheds light upon some of the British failings and disadvantages.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Indians
As already suggested, the Tate of the Europeans in the Illinois 
country--whether British, French or Spanish--depended in large 
measure upon the Indians. In a remote territory with long and 
tenuous supply and communications lines and one in which the 
European powers kept only nominal military forces, the safety of the 
white man's settlements could only be maintained through Indian 
friendship. Similarly, the primary commercial pursuit in the Illinois 
country, the skin and fur trade, could only be undertaken with the 
cooperation of the Indians Who performed most of the hunting. The 
Indians also were indispensable to the whites in the rivalries and 
warfare between European powers. If war between Great Britain and
f
Spain had come to the Illinois country, as was rumored in the late 
1760s, it would have been fought by the Indian allies of each 
belligerent, as well as by the belligerents, themselves. For the 
Europeans, Indian alliances were the currency of power in the interior, 
and groups of whites attempted to use their Indian allies against their 
enemies, both other whites and hostile Indians. At the same time, the 
integral part played by Indian relations in all of the Europeans' 
pursuits in the region gave Indians a measure of influence over the 
whites, and groups of Indians worked to play groups of whites off one 
another and made demands upon Europeans as part of the terms of
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white-Indian friendship. The British efforts to control the Illinois 
country, then, were always bound up in Indian relations.
Although Europeans sometimes spoke of the Indians as a 
homogeneous mass, there never existed a single Indian w ill or 
program in the Illinois country. Many different Indian groups resided 
in or passed through the region, and these separate groups functioned 
independently of one another. Alliances existed between groups, but 
these were never permanent and shifted frequently, while even 
within a given group considerable divergence could occur in the 
actions of its various elements. In their Indian relations, then, 
Europeans could never deal simply with a single Indian confederacy 
or even a small number of unified political entities. Rather, they acted 
within a matrix of changing alliances and rivalries between many 
small groups.
During the French regime, the immediate area around the Illinois 
settlements had been occupied by groups of what was called the 
Illinois nation, the largest of these groups being the Kaskaskia, 
Cahokia, Peoria. Tamaroa and Michigamea. Many of the Illinois 
withdrew with the French to the west side of the Mississippi after
1763. but in 1766 the Illinois in British territory still numbered about 
1,300, with the largest con'centration residing near the village of 
Kaskaslcia.1 These Indians seem to have come to accept British 
dominance of the country. In May of 1768, for instance, when the 
British at Fort de Chartres daily expected an attack by hostile 
Potawatomi Indians. Illinois groups joined the British in their
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*preparations. John Jennings, an agent or George Morgan's company, 
reported that the Mitchigamea had promised to fight with the British 
and, later, that the Kaskaskia had been sent out by Edward Cote 
against the British enemies.2 The decade or the British regime, 
however, represented the latter stages of a tong period or decline fee 
the Illinois, and their significance as British allies dwindled with their 
population. Throughout the 18th century, they experienced frequent 
warfare with groups to the north, like the Potawatomi, and with the 
Chickasaw to the south. This warfare helped to reduce tlieir 
population to the point where, in 1775. there remained only 700 
Illinois east of the Mississippi.3
To the north of the Illinois groups, in the region of Lake Michigan 
and the upper Mississippi river, lived a number of peoples who 
exerted influence on the Illinois country. Of these groups, the 
Potawatom i appear most frequently in the records and 
correspondence of the British regime in Illinois. Beginning in the late 
17th century, the Potawatomi gradually expanded south from their 
refuge on Lake Michigan's Door penninsula until they dominated the 
region of present-day northern Illinois. As a consequence of this 
expansion, they were the group most responsible for breaking the 
power of tne Illinois Indians, driving them south to the villages on the 
Mississippi where the British eventually found them. The Potawatomi 
represented an important part of the confederation of Pontiac's 
uprising and remained hostile to the British after 1765 to the extent 
that General Gage described them as one of the two most troublesome
4 2
groups in the West, citing their frequent raids in the Illinois country 
and their refusal to allow British traders to move in 
territory. *  In 1768, for example, the Pot aw at o mi murdered two 
English trade irs who had gone to their territory in search of business, 
while in 1771 the Potawatomi attacked George Morgan's plantation 
near Fort de Chartres, kifting two workers and taking a third 
prisoner.5 Furthermore, the Potawatomi traded extensively with 
merchants from St. Louis.6 Other Indian groups to the north of the 
Illinois nation included the Kickapoo and Mascouten, whose 18th 
century expansion, like that of the Potawatomi. came at the expense of 
the Illinois, and the Fox and Sauk 7 Finally. Morgan s records suggest 
that the British in Illinois were threatened at times by another 
northern group, the Chippewa In 1767, Chipewa plundered two 
batleaux belonging to Baynton. Wharton and Morgan and killed 
fourteen of the company s employees. On the otherhand, Colonel 
Wilkins held at least one council with Chippewa at Fort de Chartres, 
which would imply a state of amity between some of these Indians 
and the British or at least an attempt to establish peaceful relations.8 
The territory east of the British Illinois villages also provided 
several Indian groups important to the Illinois country. In the early 
18th century, a number of Piankashaw (a group of the Miami nation), 
Mascouten and Kickapoo came together on the Wabash river at what 
became the French trading post of Vincennes, or St. Vincent.9 This 
grouping, along with other Miami Indians such as the Wea, constituted 
what the British referred to a~ the Wabash Indians. ' In the summer
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or 1768, a group of these Indians atacked a Baynton, Wharton and 
Morgan hunting party, killing eight men. General Gage later reported 
that this attack had been justified, since the hunters had encroached 
upon Indian lands and had killed deer, bear and beaver. These 
animals, the pelts of which were the Indians' main trade items, were 
more jelously guarded than the buffalo, which were used primarily for 
food and had been the British hunters' stated quarry.10 These 
Indians greatly worried the British, as they were supposedly under 
the sway of hostile and treacherous French traders at Vincennes. In 
1772, General Gat© ordered the French to evacuate Vincennes, but the 
traders claimed that they possessed valid land titles, and the Wabash 
Indians threatened to attack Gage $ agents.11
Finally, a number of peoples from Spanish Illinois and from lands 
south of the British villages are worth mentioning. Morgan s accounts 
for Indian presents record visits to Fort de Chartres of Great and Little 
Osage, Missouri, and Illinois Indians who resided west of the 
Mississippi. These visits must have been welcome, in so far as the 
Indians brought news of Britain's French and Spanish rivals.*2 From 
the south, the Arkansas sometimes moved and hunted in the Illinois 
country, as did the Chickasaw. Elements of both of these groups at 
times were on good terms with the British. In 1771, for instance, 
General Gage suggested to Johnson that Chickasaw visiting Fort de 
Chartres be sent to attack the Potawatomi, while two y 'ars later the 
French traders at Vincennes complained of the British sending 
Chickasaw to plunder their goods.13 From the southeast, the Shawnee
and Cherokee came to Illinois. The latter group was allied to the 
British and, like the Chickasaw, sometimes attacked French traders in 
the Illinois country.14
When the first British arrived in Illinois in late 1765, they entered 
a difficult situation with regards to the region's Indians. Many of the 
groups descibed above had been allied with the French during the 
Seven Years War, while some had warred upon the British in Pontiac's 
uprising. As late as April, 1765, groups of Illinois, Missouri and Osage 
had come to Fort de Chartres to inform the French commandant of 
their resolve to continue warring on the British, and emissaries from 
the Wabash region had proclaimed that they preferred death to 
submission. Furthermore, such declarations had been made in spite of 
the commandant s insistence that the war with Great Britain was 
over.15 George Croghan's negotiations in 1765 and 1766 restored 
peace to the region, but it was a tenuous peace, at best. Captain 
Stirling reported that the Indians remained insolent towards the 
British, and William Johnson told the home government in 1767 that, 
while the Illinois country s Indians were now favorably disposed to 
the British, they entertain a very Slender opinion of our Faith and 
Sincerity. 16 Such statements, and the Indian attacks noted above, 
suggest that considerable effort was required to maintain amity with 
the Indians in Illinois.
A speech made by tevacher. a chief of one of the groups o f the 
Illinois nation, to French and British »t  New Orleans in 1765 suggests 
the kind of conduct the Indians required of the British. Levacher had
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come to New Orleans to confirm reports that his territory had been 
ceded by the French. "Since [the French emperor] rejects us," he 
declared, "we are masters of our bodies and our lands." To British 
officials, Levacher said:
You English only ask tob kill; you have caused the red men 
to die: do not be surprised if I speak to you likewise; if I 
scold you, my heart is still sore because I have seen so many 
French and Indians die together. When the English conduct 
themselves well toward the red men. we shall look upon them 
with pleasure.
The Indians, or at least those represented by Levacher, demanded 
that they be regarded as sovereign in their own country and that the 
British make amends for the late war by treating the Indians as 
friends and allies. Croghan stated that many Indians considered the 
British to be under obligation to them, since the British were new in 
the West, and Stirling reported that Indians claimed almost all of the 
Illinois country's land, the French having purchased virtually none of 
it.18 In return for peace and amity, it seems, the Indians required 
that the British be generous*in the trade and with presents and that 
they refrain from challenging the Indians' supremacy in the interior.
These were the same requirements which the French had 
confronted during the decades prior to their loss of the North 
American interior. French policy during the period of expansion was 
to build posts on unclaimed ground or with the permission of a given 
area's dominant group, and, in a sense, the French were never 
sovereign in the interior. In so far as they relied upon Indian 
cooperation to keep the posts secure and the lines of communication
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open, they conceded to the Indians a measure of control in places like 
the Illinois country.19 Historian Richard White asserts that the French 
and Indians in the late 17th and early 18th centuries developed a set 
of practices which allowed them to function together as allies and 
trading partners. French traders, for instance, married or became 
involved in other sexual relationships with Indian women, practices 
which created ties between .Indian and whue communities. Traders 
often lived for long periods of time in Indian villages. French officials 
and traders used gift-giving to help secure amicable relations with 
Indian groups. French authorities endeavored to mediate between 
warring Indians. These practices formed a "middle ground" upon 
which conflicts could be resolved and trade carried on. each side 
accommodating the other in certain ways. Such mutual 
accommodation, of course, was never universal. The French were 
never on friendly terms with all of the interior s Indian groups, and 
violence between whites and Indians was frequent, but this "middle 
ground" formed a basis for white-Indian interaction.20
Statements like Levacher’s speech suggest that at least some 
groups of Indians after the Seven Years War sought to continue a 
situation in which the region's Europeans, which now meant the 
British officials and traders, would respect and accommodate their 
needs and desires. As already suggested, British control over events 
in the Illinois country depended upon the British securing the 
friendship of Indians with whom they could trade and who could be 
used against rival Europeans and other Indians. This dependence
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gave Indian groups a measure of influence over the British, who 
labored under the necessity of maintaining their Indian alliances 
while avoiding the surrender of too much power to Indians.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Stalemate in the Trade
Imperial authorities could set policy and try to enforce it. but in 
the interior that policy's success or failure relied upon the actions of 
individuals. Illinois was a remote territory from the administrative 
centers in the Atlantic molonies and Canada, and the British 
government could afford to keep in Illinois only a small garrison with 
which to execute its rules. As time passed, the need for economy in its 
North American operations forced Great Britain to reduce even further 
its military presence. In this absence of strong government authority, 
the responsibility for making the territory live up to the home 
government's expectations rested with private Illinois inhabitants, 
both British nationals and the Frenchmen who, remaining east of the 
Mississippi, found themselves British subjects. Only these inhabitants, 
by following the dictates of British policy even without the coercion of 
British authority, could render that policy effective.
Traders in skins and furs comprised the segment of the white 
population upon which the realization of the home government's 
vision for the Illinois country most depended. Since pelts were an 
enumerated commodity, the trade could be expected to bring revenue 
to the home government, while the trade also would provide a market 
for British manufactured goods.1 Furthermore, the trade was bound 
up with the security of the territory, since amicable commerce 
between British subjects and the region's Indians would help foster
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the friendly relations needed to keep the territory peaceful. In short, 
the trade, if properly conducted, would serve to render the Illinois 
country valuable to the Empire and would help maintain British 
authority in the region through Indian alliances.
These two goals, revenue and security, inspired the trade 
regulations put in place after the conclusion of the war. Combining a 
mercantilist regard for protecting the Empire's colonial wealth with a 
reaction to the practical necessity of keeping the interior peaceful, 
these regulations were designed to impose upon traders a system 
which would ensure that their business practices neither deprived the 
Empire of revenue nor caused disruptions with the Indians. Under the 
imperial program, the trade in skins and furs was to have been an 
orderly affair carried out under the watchful eyes of British officials. 
Trade being restricted to the British posts, military officers and Indian 
agents could ensure that commerce- operated in such a way that the 
proceeds of the trade remained in British hands and the Indians 
remained peaceful and satisfied.
In the reality of the Illinois country, however, the trade proved a 
far cry from the picture of order and profit found in the imperial 
program of management. Rather than a controlled operation in Which 
British subjects traded British goods at British posts a n d  villages, 
Illinois commerce turned out to be a confusing mass of varying 
practices. As already touched upon, traders carried on business with 
Indians outside of the posts, goods and money moved across the 
Mississippi river s international boundary, and traders from the
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British territory employed business practices which deprived the 
Empire of revenue. British authorities, whether army officers or 
Indian department officials like Edward Cole, lacked the power to fully 
impose the imperial regulations by force, and the inhabitants of the 
territory were unwilling or unable to adhere to the rules of their own 
volition. The imperial program, designed to secure revenue for the 
Empire and limit the activities of traders so as to avoid disruptions 
with the Indians, fit neither the trade conditions of the Illinois country 
nor the desires and expectations of traders. The individual Illinois 
trader s need to secure profits proved to be inconsistent with the 
Empire s need to gain revenue and control interactions with Indians. 
The difficulties and confusion which resulted from this situation 
helped convince people like General Gage that the Illinois country was 
not worth the effort and expense it cost Great Britain to maintain its 
security and keep its commerce legitimate.
The traders of the Illinois country can be grouped into three 
general parties: the French merchants who had withdrawn to Spanish 
territory after the war but who continued to carry on business in 
British Illinois; the French who remained in the territory east of the 
Mississippi under British dominion; and the British, such as George 
Morgan, who came to the Illinois country following British occupation 
in 1765. Each of these parties had dealings with the others; 
sometimes they cooperated, sometimes they competed Each 
employed trade practices which diverged from the British imperial
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program. A look into the activities of these parties yields a picture of 
the Illinois trade situation s complexity.
While each of the general types of Indian trader possessed certain 
advantages and disadvantages in the trade, all three parties labored 
under several unfavorable conditions in the Illinois country. First, the 
remoteness of the region confronted traders with a long and difficult 
passage from wherever their goods might come, whether Philadelphia 
for the British traders or New Orleans for the Spanish and French. 
From Philadelphia, the shipment of goods involved hauling the 
merchandize over the mountains to Fort Pitt and then shipping it in 
batteaux down the Ohio river and up the Mississippi the short distance 
to the Illinois villages.2 Optimally, the journey on the rivers would 
take about one month,3 but the passage offered a number of possible 
difficulties. Indian groups like the Delaware and Shawnee, for 
instance, were in a position to easily obstruct the flow of men and 
goods down the Ohio river if they happened to be at enmity with 
Britain.'* The Ohio river, itself, could cause problems in that it 
featured several points at which the water was sometimes too shallow 
to allow the passage of a loaded batteau. In these cases, the boats had 
to be unloaded and the goods carried along the shore until the river 
sufficiently deepened 5 The passage up the Mississippi from the 
mouth of the Ohio had to be accomplished through rowing, and at 
tithes batteaux proved too heavy to be rowed upstream by their crews 
and had to be left at the rivers confluence until more men could be 
sent down.6 The expense of transporting goods from the eastern
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colonies to IfWnois represented the greatest difficulty. George Morgan, 
in setting ep ltis company's venture in Illinois, had to create a 
transportation system from nothing, contracting with men to 
undertake every step from hauling the wood with which to build 
batteaux to guiding the finished craft to Illinois.? In autumn of 1766, 
Morgan expressed to company agent John Irwin his horror at the cost 
of this activity. "Indeed." Morgan wrote." the Enormous Expenses 
attending it. at Times makes us almost Sick."8
The journey from New Orleans to the Illinois country involved 
difficulties rivaling those of the Ohio passage. During the French and 
Spanish regimes, an official convoy carrying merchants' goods and 
supplies for the military traveled north to Illinois eaih year. These 
convoys benefited from the presence of soldiers posted (Ml the 
batteaux to guard the goods and help in the rowing. The journey 
commenced in late summer and lasted three or four months, owing to 
the necessity of rowing the entire way against the current Setting out 
so late in the year, the convoy ran the risk of being ice-locked if the 
Mississippi experienced an early freeze, while it presented a target for 
attack by such hostile Indian groups as the Cherokee and Chickasaw. 
The return trip from the Illinois country, of course, was much more 
quick and easy. A convoy usually set out in February, when the river 
was high and swift, and the journey lasted about 20 days. Naturally, 
traders did not have to send their merchandize in these protective 
convoys, and the private transportation of goods went on at other 
times, although these journeys lacked the convoys military guards.9
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All three parties involved in the Illinois country s trade, then, were 
hindered in their operations by the danger and expense involved just 
in getting their merchandize to the territory.
A general decline in the productivity of the interior in skins and 
furs also hindered traders after 1763 British customs records 
indicate that the number of skins and furs imported into England 
decreased annually after the war. in spite of the British acquisition of 
vast new lands thought to have been rich with fur-bearing animals. 
The illegal trade practices which resulted in skins and furs from 
British territory being sent to France and Spain must have contributed 
to this decline, but there are indications that the causes of the 
phenomenon went beyond the machinations of lawless traders. In the 
Illinois country, at least, business for the French and Spanish seemed 
to be hardly better than for the British. George Morgan spoke in 176i 
of twenty bankruptcies among the traders west of the Mississippi and 
the general slowness of the commerce. On several occasions, Morgan 
also commented on the poor quality of the skins and furs coming from 
both sides of the river. 1 1 These reports suggest that the Illinois 
country was becoming less productive for all persons involved in the 
trade. ►
Despite the existence of these difficulties inherent in the Illinois 
country trade, British nationals in Illinois frequently reported that the 
schemes of traders from the Spanish territory formed the greatest 
barrier to British commercial success. As early as 1766, Lieutenant 
Alexander Fraser, who had visited the Illiniois country as a British
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emissary prior to the restoration of peace with the Indians, described 
the trade situation as close to hopeless. British traders, he asserted, 
could undersell the French in the interior by up to one-fourth, but the 
illegal French traders were so well acquainted with the Indians and 
treacherous towards the British that the British could probably never 
overcome their competition. 12 Only a year after their first goods 
arrived in Illinois, Baynton, Wharton and Morgan declared that the 
company had suffered great damage due to the French from west of 
the river trafficking in British territory, and several months later they 
admitted outright that they had failed to win the tra d e .13 The same 
year, Morgan reported that French treachery among the Indians was 
such that to ascend the Mississippi or Illinois Rivers would be certain 
Death. ‘ 14
Surely, the obstacle presented by the traders fros? Spanish Illinois 
operating in British territory was a real one. These traders benefited 
from past experience in trading in the region and from already 
existing relationships with at least some of the Illinois country s 
Indians. The abundance of British complaints against these traders 
and the British willingness to blame their failures in the interior on 
their old French enemies, however, should not be allowed to 
overshadow other aspects qf the trade situation. Commerce in the 
Illinois country was never just a matter of French experience and 
treachery defeating British efforts to engross the trade. The 
authorities in Spanish Illinois, for example, worried as much as the 
British about commercial rivalry. While the British viewed the
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withdrawal of French traders to St. Louis as a tactic whereby these 
traders would escape British authority while retaining the commerce 
of the British territory, the Spanish saw the arrival of British traders 
in Illinois as a clear threat to Spanish interests. Governor Ulloa felt 
that British merchants had come to Illinois with "the purpose of 
establishing a profitable commerce with this province [that is, Spanish 
Illinois) and gradually absorbing the silver entering." British 
merchandize was cheaper than that of the Spanish or French traders, 
and Ulloa worried that whatever specie the government sent up from 
New Orleans would be used to purchase this merchandize and, as a 
result, end up in British hands. To prevent this, Ulloa prohibited the 
transfer of silver to British Illinois and ordered that soldiers and 
officials not be paid until such time as they were preparing to depart
the territory. 15
Governor Ulloa's worries were not unfounded. The presence of 
British merchants in the Illinois country drew traders from west of 
the Mississippi seeking the best possible terms for business, in 1767, 
for example, William Johnson reported that British traders in the 
interior helped the French and Spanish to engross the British 
territory's trade by selling them British merchandize, which was 
cheaper than goods sent up from New Orleans. 16 the records of 
Baynton, Wharton and Morgan show that the company's operatives 
attempted to take part in this illegal activity. In the summer of 1768, 
Morgan wrote to his partners, "I have every day for these ten Days 
past had different French Men with me from the other side of the
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Mississippi for Goods." These men, however, could not pay Morgan 
until the following spring, and. therefore, he refused their offers. 
Furthermore, most of the French traders were indebted to New 
Orleans merchants whose agents in Spanish Illinois endeavored to 
keep the traders from selling their pelts to anyone but their 
creditors. 1?
Despite this situation, the company records suggest that Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan carried out some illegal commerce with the 
traders of Spanish Illinois. John Richard Hanson, the company's 
operative in Cahokia, the main center in the British territory for the 
pelt trade, reported in 1770 that "Almost all of the Missouri traders 
are arrived from their Wintering with plenty of Peltries." and he 
hoped the company had sufficient goods to sell. 1 ® An earlier 
correspondence from company agent Windsor Brown to Morgan 
detailed Brown's attempts to secure the return of goods belonging to 
Baynton, Wharton and Morgan from an unnamed trader in the Spanish 
territory. Brown described his plans to cross the Mississippi to 
retrieve the merchandize and secure an account of what the trader 
had already sold. This merchandize consisted of Indian trade goods 
such as kettles and tomahawks, and much of it had been sent to St. 
Louis. 19 That the company had forwarded goods, apparently on 
credit, to a merchant in Spanish Illinois suggests that Morgan and his 
associates actively sought commerce with their rivals across the 
Mississippi.
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Several of the Spanish territory's merchants appear in the Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan business records. "Monsieur Pratte of Misire 
(Ste. Genevieve)'' held an account with the store at Fort Chartres in 
1769. Pratte was a merchant who had moved to the west side of the 
Mississippi from Kaskaskia as early as 1766, since he appears on the 
Ste. Genevieve militia role for that year.20 A Monsieur 'Cerry" sold 
over 800 livres (about £40) worth of skins and furs to the company in 
1772, while a "Cerrie" appears soon after this first entry with more 
skins and furs. It seems likely that this Cerry or Cerrie'' was, in fact, 
the merchant Cerre, whom Louis Houck describes as having been the 
principle trader in kaskaskia prior to British occupation, at which time 
he had moved to St. Louis.2 1 In 1772, the company was trying to 
resolve its business in the Illinois country and Cerre's large deliveries 
of pelts may have represented the settlement of an outstanding 
account. A trader from St. Louis named Hubert also shows up in 
Morgan's papers as having had an account with the company, as does 
a Monsieur Carpentier, who might have been the merchant Carpentier 
whom Spanish officials listed as one of their territory's principle skin 
and fur traders and whom Houck describes as an early resident of Ste. 
Genevieve.22 Finally, one of Baynton. Wharton and Morgan's best 
early customers was a Monsieur Dubord, who in 1766 purchased over 
1,000 livres (about £50) worth of merchandize, most of it cloth. The 
present author can find only one reference to a Dubord outside of the 
company's records, and this is to a Joseph Dubord who received a land 
grant in 1770 in the Spanish territory. Dubord, then, may have lived
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west of the Mississippi during the time of his dealings with Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan. If so, this business would have been illegal.23 
The profits gained by British merchants in trading with inhabitants 
of the Spanish territory probably were never great enough to offset 
the general British failure to win the trade with the Indians. As 
already indicated, Morgan failed to do much business with the traders 
who came to him in search of goods, and examples of successful trade 
with the merchants of Spanish Illinois were not so frequent as to 
imply the existence of a stable or lucrative relationship. These 
examples, however, demonstrate that merchants on both sides of the 
Mississippi were willing to engage in activities which deprived their 
respective governments of revenue and took wealth out of their 
territories. While Morgan lobbied for the construction of new forts to 
halt the movement of illegal traders in and out of the Illinois country, 
he worked, in a sense, to help those illegal traders by selling them 
British merchandize. This is not to say that Morgan consciously set out 
to undercut his imperial government's authority and policies. Rather, 
Morgan's actions stand as a testament to the inappropriateness of 
those policies to conditions in the Illinois country. The French from 
west of the Mississippi still controlled part of the skin and fur trade in 
British Illinois, while Morgan and his agents possessed goods which 
these traders desired. In this situation. Morgan and his agents took 
what they probably saw as a logical step and attempted to trade with
i
the French who came illegally to the company’s stores. This illegal 
trade, then, demonstrates three aspects of commerce in the Illinois
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country. First, the fact that Morgan tried to sell trade goods to 
merchants who were ostensibly his company's rivals suggests thai he 
and his agents had been unable in their own right to secure a 
satisfactory amount of trade with the Indians. Second, it shows that 
the French from Spanish I mois continued to trade successfully in 
British territory. Finally, the illegal trade demonstrates that a rivalry 
between the British and the traders of Spanish Illinois did not always 
exist. Certainly, these two parties competed, but they did so as 
individual merchants, rather than as members of national groups, and 
when conditions suggested it they set aside their rivalry and the 
mercantilist policies of their respective imperial authorities in favor of 
mutual profit.
This commerce between British traders like Morgan and the French 
of the Spanish territory could not erase the anxiety felt by British 
nationals over the presence of their erstwhile enemies in Illinois. 
Many British believed that the French on both sides of the Mississippi 
conspired against them. A 1768 report drawn up most likely by 
Captain Forbes, then commander at Fort de Chartres, on Commerce in 
the Illinois Country” asserted that the French on either side of the 
river worked together, those from the east sending skins and furs 
across the river in return for French merchandize sent up from New 
Orleans. It also stated that the French traders, though British subjects, 
would not send their pelts to a British port unless they were offered a 
bond.24 Late in the same year, Colonel Wilkins reported that 
inhabitants landed merchandize openly on the east bank of the
62
river.25 For Baynton, Wharton and Morgan, the French inhabitants 
presented an added threat in the form of competition to their 
campaign to win a contract for supplying the Illinois military. At the 
time of the company's initial operations in Illinois, Colonel Reed, then 
commander at Fort de Chartres, had an agreement with French 
resident Daniel Blouin for provisions Morgan reported that French 
hunters moved throughout the territory and suggested that Reed was 
too much under the influence of the French inhabitants.26 Finally, the 
French in British territory, like those who infiltrated from Spanish 
Illinois, tended to be on good terms with the area s Indians and. as 
such, could safely conduct their business at the Indian villages, while 
imperial regulations and Indian hostility kept the British bottled up at 
the established posts.27
While the French on either side of the Mississippi could cooperate 
with each other in the trade, Frenchmen from the British territory 
sometimes represented a threat to their co-nationals across the river 
and to Spanish authorities Just as French traders from west of the 
Mississippi conducted business in British Illinois, French traders from 
east of the river operated in Spanish territory in ways which 
presented the legal traders of the region with competition. In 1773. a 
small diplomatic crisis flared up when the Spanish authorities learned 
that a merchant from Cahokia. Jean Marie Ducharme, had slipped up 
the Missouri river and begun to trade with the Missouri and Little 
Osage Indians. The Spanish commandant, Pedro Piernas, had recently 
prohibited commercial relations with these two groups as punishment
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for their hostility towards the white population, and he viewed 
Ducharme's expedition as a willful attempt to deepen the 
estrangement between the Indians and the Spanish. In an angry 
letter to the British commander, Hugh Lord, Piernas wrote, "those 
violators of the most reserved rights. . , have spread defamatory 
speeches against us, and consequently they have added renewed 
strength to the hatred by the Indians. Piernas further charged that 
Ducharme and his associates had sold their goods at artificially low 
prices to their own loss, so as to convince the Indians that the traders 
of the Spanish territory, with their higher prices, had been cheating 
them. Piernas also referred to other incidents in which traders from 
British Illinois had invaded Spanish lands A posse, organized by 
Piernas and led by the trader Pierre Laclede, eventually captured 
Ducharme near the Missouri river and. after confiscating his goods, 
sent him back to British territory. The Ducharme affair, then, suggests 
that the French traders were not always united across the Mississippi 
river. Rather, operations like that of Ducharme could pose a threat to 
the French traders of Spanish Illinois, as well as to the Spanish 
authorities, by disrupting trade relations with groups of Indians. The 
correspondence between Piernas and Lord concerning the Ducharme 
affair presents a picture of the difficulties authorities on both sides of 
the Mississippi experienced in trying to restrict movement across 
what was a rather unimposing international boundary.28
Despite the continuing dominance ol the trade by French 
merchants, the French residing in British territory represented more
6 4
to the British traders than competition. While Colonel Wilkins could
complain of French goods from New Orleans being transported into
British territory, the records of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan su». jest
that the French inhabitants of British Illinois also purchased
considerable amounts of British merchandize. Like the traders of
Spanish Illinois who came illegally to the Baynton. Wharton and
Morgan stores in search of better goods and prices, the French in
British territory were not above buying from their former enemies.
Indeed, such trade was even easier for them than for the French
across the river, since it was legal In the spring of 1767, the Baynton,
Wharton and Morgan's agent? received instructions staling, "We
entirely approve of your interesting . creditable French Traders U
beg you will prudently continue to dispose of all the goods you
possibly can in the same way.' 29 A vear later, Morgan reported that
"general Bankruptcies among the French Traders ' were cutting into his
business.30 Also in 1768, Morgan wrote to Baynton that his hopes for
procuring skins and furs had been raised by his learning that the
autumn convoy from New Orleans had consisted of fewer dry goods
than in previous years, and he declared that We are just entering into
the proper Channel for the pelt trade.31 These letters suggest that
tiie company purchased a considerable number of its skins and furs
from French inhabitants, who continued to control the trade with the
Indians, rather than from the Indians, themselves. A smaller New
«
Orleans convoy meant that’ B /nton, Wharton and Morgan held a 
greater share of the trade goods in the territory and, as such, could
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expect more French traders to come to them with their pelts On the 
other hand, failure on the part of the French to buy skins and furs 
from the Indians meant fewer pelts, in turn, for Morgan s company to 
purchase from the French.
The business journals and correspondence from the company's 
various stores also support the idea that at least some of the French 
traders in British Illinois sold their skins and furs to British traders. 
Ir. the autumn of 1769, Windsor Brown worked to induce the 
company s debtors to bring in skins and furs with which to settle their 
accounts. The two debtors Brown mentioned by name in a letter to 
Morgan were both French.32 The company s business journals refer 
to money owed to a Monsieur Bauvies (probably Beauvais, a 
prominent family in Kaskaskia) and to Monsieur Traversie for pelts, 
and they make note of orders made by John Richard Hanson in favor 
of Frenchmen trading skins and furs.3 3 The journals also note 
transactions with Frenchmen involving goods which were obviously 
destined for trade with the Indians, such as when Pierre Ladrout 
bought wampum in the autumn of 1766. Although the journals do not 
actually mention pelts in these last instances, the fact that the 
Frenchmen in question were buying Indian trade goods suggests that 
Baynton, Wharton and Morgan eventually would be paid in pelts.34
In addition to the commerce in pelts. Baynton, Wharton and 
Morgan maintained a steady business with the French of British 
Illinois who were not skin and fur traders Documents like the 1768 
report on the "Commerce of the Illinois Country assert that the French
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inhabitants preferred to trade with their co-nationals whose goods 
came from New Orleans,35 but the business journals of Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan suggest that the French traded with the British 
company from the outset of its Illinois venture. Almost every page of 
these journals notes transactions with Frenchmen, and the names of 
prominent Illinois families, such as Lagrange, Charleville, and 
Beauvais, app^u- Even Daniel Blouin, with whom the company 
competed for thv right to sell provisions to the military, occasionally 
bought goods from Morgan s stores. Rum and textiles, along with 
rifles, shot and powder, were the most popular items.36 |n early 
1769, Morgan asked Baynton to send 400 rifles and a great lot of 
cotton cloth, out of which the inhabitants liked to make their trousers, 
and he reported that flowered cloth sent earlier had been well- 
received by the French women. Morgan employed hunters who killed 
deer and buffalo in the Illinois area and to the south, and he sold some 
of this meat to the French inhabitants. In 1768, he reported that this 
activity was bringing good returns.38 Finally, the company dealt 
lucratively in black slaves. Morgan s first year in Illinois led him to 
believe that the inhabitants would pay dearly for slaves, and he felt 
that he would be able to demand payment for them half in pelts and 
half in badly needed cash. When Morgan returned to the Illinois 
country in late 1767 after a visit to Philadelphia, he brought with him 
several hundred French-speaking slaves from Jamaica. He was able to 
sell all of these people within a year's time at about $400 Philadelphia 
currency (about L240) each.39
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The fact that the French in British Illinois traded with Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan from the beginning of the company's operations 
should not be allowed to obscure the difficulties involved in that 
commerce. The scarcity of specie in the region represented the most 
daunting of these difficulties. The French inhabitants preferred to pay 
their debts in farm produce, since the Illinois country was chronically 
short of cash. If traded to French merchants, this produce could be 
sent down river for sale in New Orleans. Baynton, Wharton and 
Morgan, however, had to ship what they could not use or sell again in 
Illinois to Philidelphia, an expensive endeavor. The company used the 
produce it received for provisioning the military and in a short-lived 
distilling venture, but these two operations required only a limited 
amount of grain and livestock, particularly with the company's 
continuing failure to secure a provisions contract, in 1770, Morgan 
reported a great want of European goods in Illinois but added that the 
inhabitants had no way of paying for them which could be of use to 
the company. The company, for its part, preferred to pay its debts in 
bills of exchange, but the French could only sell these bills at a 
discount, so this mode of payment was frowned upon. During the 
French regime, inhabitants had used a kind of note called a bon, but 
Colonel Wilkins banned their use soon after his arrival. Late in 1767, 
Morgan wrote to his partners that he needed eight to ten-thousand 
dollars cash in Illinois but that he would be grateful if one-thousand 
could be sent.40
Taking into account the problems caused by the paucity of specie 
in the region, it still seems that Baynton, Wharton and Morgan were 
successful in drawing the French inhabitants of British Illinois to trade 
with them. At least some of the French skin and fur merchants dealt 
with the company, and many French inhabitants who were not traders 
bought goods for their personal use at the company's stores. 
Meanwhile, the British traders, themselves, did not merely wait at the 
posts for Indians and French inhabitants to be drawn thither by 
British merchandize. While the home government envisioned a well- 
ordered commerce which would take place at the posts and benefit 
the Empire, traders like George Morgan reacted to conditions in the 
Illinois country by employing practices which ranged from the merely 
irregular to the clearly illegal.
As already mentioned, the Baynton, Wharton and Morgan stores 
attracted French traders whose skins and furs had been procured in 
ways which contravened the imperial British trade regulations. In 
addition to accepting the business of these illegal traders, the company 
attempted to employ Frenchmen directly as factors. This idea made 
sense in so far as the French tended to enjoy better relations with the 
Indians than did the British. The instructions of the first group of 
Baynton, Wharton and Morgan agents to go to Illinois advised them, if 
possible, to immediately employ a number of French traders. "This we 
look upon as an object of real Consequence, the instructions read, "as 
they have their Connections and great Influence with the Natives of 
that Neighborhood, etc. "'* I Employing French agents in this manner
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was perfectly legal. The French who had remained east of the 
Mississippi after British occupation were British subjects and, as such, 
allowed to trade in British territory. The Frenchmen in Baynton, 
Wharton and Morgan's employ, however, sometimes worked for the 
company in ways which violated imperial trade regulations. In early 
1767, Morgan wrote from Philadelphia to inform operatives in Illinois 
that a Monsieur Maisonviile would soon be at the confluence of the 
Mississippi and Ohio rivers with a load of skins and furs. The 
recipients of the letter were to direct Maisonviile to send the pelts 
down to New Orleans, and they were to supply Maisonviile with any 
trade goods he requested.42 That Maisonviile was at the Mississippi 
and Ohio junction suggests that he had been trading outside of the 
posts, an activity contrary to imperial regulations, since in 1767 the 
trade was still under imperial control. Furthermore, Maisonville's 
relationship with the company seems to have been that of a full- 
fledged agent, rather than an independent trader who simply bought 
goods from the company's stores. In short, the company employed a 
French agent who carried on illegal trade on its behalf. During the 
early years of the Illinois venture, Morgan also attempted to hire 
Indians to hunt for furs and skins exclusively for him.43
Another of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan's irregular trade 
activities involved trying to sell provisions to the Spanish military 
across the river. In the summer of 1767, Morgan wrote, "As the 
Spaniards have certainly got up to the Illinois by this Time, Provisions 
of every kind must be in great Demand 8t Flour in particular must rise
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in Price."44 The next year, Morgan reported that the Spanish needed 
meat and that he was expecting the commander, Colonel Forbes, to 
approve his exporting buffalo killed by company hunters. At this 
time, Colonel Forbes was still receiving provisions from Daniel Blouin, 
so the plan to sell food to the Spanish might have been designed to 
offset the losses which resulted from the company's continuing failure 
to win a contract with the British military.45
The difficulty involved in shipping goods from the Illinois country 
to the Atlantic coast colonies created the impetus for a third irregular 
commercial activity, the trading of goods with French and Spanish 
merchants in New Orleans. British merchandize reached the Illinois 
country by way of the Ohio river, but returning boats up the Ohio, 
against its current, was slow, difficult and expensive. As such, British 
traders preferred to send their pelts and other goods on the easier 
passage down the Mississippi to New Orleans, where ships could then 
carry them to a British port. New Orleans' international market, 
however, tempted British merchants to sell their goods to the French 
and Spanish. In early 1767, General Gage lamented that, while the 
British possessions yielded L80.000 sterling in skins and furs per 
annum, very little of it passed through British ports, where the 
government could exact duties upon it.46 George Morgan's
correspondence with Bart MacNamara, his comapny's contact in New 
Orleans, suggests that Morgan sometimes joined in the practice of 
selling skins and furs to the merchants of that city. In the summer of 
1766, MacNamara informed Baynton, Wharton and Morgan that the
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French in New Orleans were offering better prices than those available 
at British ports.47 A letter from one year later details MacNamara's 
attempts to sell pelts newly arrived from the Illinois country to 
French and Spanish buyers. There was a general dearth of cash 
among the New Orleans merchants at that time, and MacNamara 
ended up sending the company's pelts on to New York, but the letter 
suggests that MacNamara's first intention was to sell the pelts to the 
French or Spanish and that this was a regular practice.4**
In addition to selling their skins and furs in New Orleans, British 
traders sometimes purchased goods at that city for use in Illinois. In 
late 1767, Morgan asked MacNamara to send him six hogsheads of 
French red wine and a gross of Indian scalping knives.49 In the 
summer of 1772, conflict arose when the authorities of Spanish Illinois 
discovered that Pablo Segond, a prominent trader of that territory, 
had brought goods belonging to the British traders James Rumsey and 
William Murray up from New Orleans. Although Murray claimed that 
Louisiana's Governor Unzaga had approved the shipment, commandant 
Piernas impounded the goods at Ste. Genevieve.50 a  similar incident 
occurred a short time later when Pablo Perigee steered hie boat into 
British territory on his way up the Mississippi from New Orleans and 
unloaded merchandize belonging to a British trader in Kaskashia.** 
Finally, British traders occasionally went so far as to violate the 
international boundary and conduct business within Spanish Illinois. 
In the autumn of 1769, Windsor Brown, Morgan's agent m  Cahokia, 
informed James Rumsey that he planned to slip into Spanish territory
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on the Missouri river during the night. Although Brown did not state 
his exact purpose in doing this, it would be fair to surmise that he was 
hoping to trade.52 jn his correspondence with Captain Lord over the 
Ducharme affair, Spanish commandant Piernas mcde reference to John 
Richard Hanson, who had taken up residence in Spanish Illinois, so 
that, according to Piernas, he could misbehave with greater impunity 
on the Mississippi River." Hanson was a British trader who earlier had 
been a factor for Baynton, Wharton and Morgan. Considering that 
Piernas was comparing Hanson's actions to those of Ducharme, 
Hanson s misbehavior must have involved illegal trade in Spanish 
territory.53 other traders from British Illinois carried on business 
west of the Mississippi. In 1767, merchants in Detroit complained that 
Edward Cole s allowing traders to go to the Indian villages had led to 
traders from British Illinois moving on the Missouri river.54 in 
documents like the letter containing the Detroit merchants' complaint, 
however, it is difficult to ascertain whether the traders referred to 
were British nationals or French inhabitants or a mixture of both. In 
the two instances noted above, the illegal traders were undoubtedly 
British. It seems unlikely-that these would have been the only 
occasions upon which British traders moved illegally in Spanish 
Illinois.
Two genera; goals lay at the heart of the British imperial program 
for the regulation of trade in the interim: the securing of economic 
benefits for the Empire and the maintenance of peaceful relations with
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the Indians. For the first of these goals to be realized, British subjects 
needed to control the region’s trade and British authorities had to 
ensure that the proceeds of the trade--most importantly, skins and 
furs--remained in British hands, where they could be taxed or where 
at least they could be expected to benefit the British economy, in 
general. In so far as this first goal involved an attempt to ensure that 
the benefits of the trade flowed only to Great Britain, it can be 
described as mercantilist. For the second goal to be accomplished, 
authorities like William Johnson felt that imperial officials needed to 
be able to oversee commercial relations between British subjects and 
the Indians, since traders left alone could not be trusted to treat the 
Indians fairly and avoid causing outbreaks of Indian violence. These 
goals inspired the regulations set up in 1764 and the actions of 
military commanders in the Illinois country even after control over 
the trade was turned over to the colonies in 1768, since the colonial 
administrations never formulated regulations to replace those of the 
imperial program.
These goats, however, and the means of securing them put forward 
by the home government and people like Johnson proved ill-fitted to 
conditions in the Illinois country. British nationals like George Morgan 
never dominated the region s skin and fur trade, while the Illinois 
country's other British subjects, the French traders, who had remained 
east of the Mississippi after the war, tended not to send their pelts to 
British ports Furthermore, British traders sometimes sold what pelts 
they did secure at New Orleans to Spanish and French merchants, who
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frequently offered better prices than those found British ports and 
who relieved British traders of ihe necessity o, reporting their 
pelts any further. Meanwhile, traders from Spanish Illinois operated 
in the British territory, further limiting the possibilities of the British 
empire profiting from the Illinois pelt trade. Finally, Johnson’s policy 
of restricting trade to the posts, where British officials could guarantee 
the traders’ good behavior towards the Indians, quickly broke down in 
Illinois, since, as Edward Colo suggested to Johnson after Cole 
authorized Illinois traders to operate outside of the posts, restricting 
transactions in this way only ensured that the territory s skins and 
furs would go to illigitimate traders
When Baynton, Wharton and Morgan failed to engross the Illinois 
country's trade u: the extent they had expected, the company s agents 
were forced to alter somewhat their business activities. George 
Morgan s attempts to carry on substantial business with French skin 
and fur merchants suggest that he envisioned a relationship whereby 
the ill effects of the continuing French dominance el the trade would 
be negated by his company s becoming the French merchants source 
of trade goods. Such a relationship, if maintained over tithe, would 
eliminate the necessity of winning the Indian trade outright Like the 
New York merchants who, prior to the Seven Years war, illegally 
obtained furs from Canada,5 5 Morgan would receive the Illinois 
country s pelts through the French in return for British merchandize. 
Rather than compete with the French traders, Morgan hoped to secure 
their cooperation with the promise of mutual profit As already
described, this operation was hindered by the French traders' 
indebtedness to merchants in New Orleans, which necessitated their 
sending their pelts to that city, although the French still carried on 
some trade with Morgan's company. Since a number of these traders 
resided in Spanish Illinois, Morgan's activities were hindered also by 
the efforts of the Spanish and British military to prevent trade across 
the Mississippi. In 1770 Morgan wrote, Matters here are carried to 
ridiculous Length on both Sides just as if the affairs of the two Nations 
depended upon these dispicable settlements. 56
Morgan's efforts to establish business relations with French pelt 
traders on either side of the Mississippi, then, represented an attempt 
to profit Trom the Illinois venture, while avoiding the competition of 
French merchants. The company s efforts to acquire land in the 
Illinois country also can be seen in this light. Morgan s land purchases 
and the grant he received from Colonel Wilkins directly contravened 
imperial policy, but these actions were taken in anticipation of Samuel 
Wharton's proposal Tor an Illinois colony being approved by the home 
governm ent If such a colony '* 'd been established, Morgan s land 
undoubtedly  would Have been valuable, and ihe arrival of colonists 
w o u ld  have provided buyers for the company ! goods Land 
•peculation represented a way in which Morgan s company could find 
profit (n the Illinois country without the Indian trade Morgan s rival, 
VFlUtim ir urrgy, also recogniied the value Of land speculation over the 
sMn and fur trad! In the spring Of I7bd, Murray expressly requested 
his business partners in Philadelphia not to send him Indian goods,
7 6
77
and, by 1773, Murray s firm, Franks and Company, had completely 
given up the Indian trade* to concentrate on its land acquisition 
schemes 5^
Commerce in the Illinois country during the British regime never 
fit the orderly model set down in the imperial trade regulations. 
Continued French dominance of the skin and fur trade ensured that 
most of the region s wealth from pelts would never benefit the British 
empire, while it forced British traders like George Morgan to abandon 
any thoughts of economic nationalism they might have entertained 
and to engage in activities which took pelts and trade merchandize out 
of the Empire. The British failed twice with regards to trade in the 
Illinois country Individual traders like Morgan failed to prize the 
commerce away from the French, while the home government and 
imperial officials failed to erect policies which could meet the complex 
trade conditions in the territory. The result was a kind of stalemate in 
which the British traders and officials, although technically the Illinois 
country belonged to them after 1765, could not exercise control over 
their possession.
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CHAPT ER  F I V E
Stalemate in White-Indian Relations
The designs of British officials and British traders for the Illinois 
country demanded that stable and amicable relations be maintained 
with at least some of the territory s Indian groups. The British 
authorities in the region needed to retain enough Indian allies to 
ensure that the area immediately around the Illinois settlements 
would remain peaceful, and they needed to be able to send these allies 
against Indian groups that were hostile to the British, such as the 
I nawatomi. Furthermore, the British military in Illinois would need 
the alliance of as many Indian groups as it could muster if the much- 
rumored war between Great Britain and Spain broke out. Traders, for 
their part, relied upon Indians as the source of the region s wealth in 
pelts As the British traders who tried to carry on business with the 
Potawatomi discovered, enmity between a given Indian group and the 
British rendered commerce impossible and made the interior a very 
dangerous place for traders
Indian relations formed perhaps the greatest source of British 
aggravation in the Illinois country. The British authorities and traders 
were never able to secure the amity of all of the region s Indian 
groups, and outbreaks of Indian violence against the British occurred 
regularly. The papers of Baynton, Wharton and Morgan contain many 
references to Indian depredations at the company s stores or against
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its batteaux and to the murder by Indians or company agents and 
British soldiers. For traders, Indian relations provided additional 
aggravation in so far as the measures taken by officials like William 
Johnson to help ensure peace with the Indians seemed to violate 
economic logic The rule limiting trade to the posts handicapped the 
traders who observed it, while the restrictions placed on interior 
settlement blocked the efforts of speculators like Samuel Wharton to 
secure land grants and found a new colony in Illinois. Meanwhile, the 
Indian alliances that the British did maintain proved so expensive that 
imperial officials began to question whether the Illinois country was 
worth to Great Britain the cost of its continued possession. Indian 
groups demanded gifts and aid from their British allies, while the 
presence of the Spanish just across the Mississippi river and of suspect 
Frenchmen throughout the interior reminded the British continually of 
their very great need to do whatever was necessary to maintain their 
Indian alliances. Officials like Colonel Wilkins worked to reduce the 
expense of Indian presents and to alter the nature of British-Indian 
relationships to the former s favor, but the British were never able to 
control Indian relations to their own satisfaction, and throughout the 
British decade the question of who really dictated the terms and tenor 
ol British-Indian relations remained open.
The difficulties just described seem to indicate that the British 
failed in their Illinois country Indian relations, but. in one sense, these 
relations can be described as having been successful. While outbreaks 
of Indian violence occurred and the expense of Indian affairs troubled
t.
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British officials, the British never found themselves engaged in a full 
Indian war. Violence was regular, but it was never organized or 
concentrated, and an attempt on the part of a group or groups of 
Indians to drive the British out of the region did not occur. Rumors 
sometimes circulated concerning the construction of a broad Indian 
coalition against the British, but such a coalition never materialized. 
The British efforts to maintain beneficial Indian relations, then, did 
not fail so much as they stalled. The British in Illinois secured enough 
Indian allies to allow them to send Indians against their enemies and 
to keep another confederacy like that of Poniiacs uprising from 
forming, but they never controlled all of the territory s Indian gtoups. 
nor could they escape the necessity of meeting some of the demands 
of their Indian allies.
In much of the British correspondence concerning Indian affairs in 
the Illinois country, one discovers a willingness on the part of the 
writers to see French machinations at the root of British troubles. In 
1766, Edward Cole suggested to William Johnson that French traders 
had lowered the prices they offered to the Indians to the point where 
surely they were making virtually no profits at all or even losing 
money. Cole saw in this situation a plot to form a large Indian alliance 
with which to drive the British from Illinois.* Similarly, General Gage 
interpreted the difficulties experienced by the British in relations with 
the Wabash river Indians as the «vork of renegade French traders 
who, with the design of monopolizing the area’s commerce, kept these 
Indians hostile to the British.2 Certainly, the intrigues of the French
8 6
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traders against the British form a part of the explanation for British 
trouble with the Indians, but documents like those just described 
suggest that the French exercised .one sort or special influence over 
the Indians. A brief examination of the French regime in the Illinois 
country prior to British takeover reveals that the French in their 
relations with the area's Ihdians experienced many of the same 
problems confronted by their British successors after 1765. 
Understanding the difficulties encountered by people who were 
thought to be more adept at Indian affairs than the British can lend 
insight into British problems.
The French in the Illinois country prior to 1765 were no more 
immune to Indian violence than were the British later. Particularly 
during the last few decades of French rule, the murder and robbery of 
Frenchmen by Indians was a regular part of life in the Illinois country, 
and often this violence was related to the skin and fur trade. In 1740, 
for example, three Frenchmen were killed and a number of others 
plundered in Illinois by Osage and Missouri Indians in what appeared 
to be a punitive attack in reaction to dishonest trading. In 1745. the 
French authorities released from confinement a group of Indians who 
had murdered a number of French traders. Their release implies that 
the killings had been justified by the traders having cheated the 
Ind ians.3 In 1751, Major de Macarty-Mact'sue, the French 
commandant at Fort de Chartres, reviewed the possibility of allowing 
hunters and traders to move on the Mississippi above the Illinois 
river, a practice which had been restricted for fear of trouble with
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Sioux Indian groups. Macarty al3 o was ordered to keep French 
hunters from moving on the Ohio river to avoid attacks by the 
Cherokee.4 Richard White suggests that Indian violence and stealing 
functioned as normal responses to such French actions as charging too 
much for goods or aiding a given Indian group's enemies and that 
these depredations were seen by the Indians as being equivalent to 
the actions countered. White asserts that violence was not only a 
regular feature, but an integral part of Indian-white relations.5 Any 
European group attempting to function in the Illinois country, it 
seems, faced the necessity of'limiting and finding adequate responses 
to this violence, and the French in the territory seem to have been no 
more successful at these tasks than were their British successors.
During the British regime, imperial restrictions on settlement 
aimed at avoiding trouble with Indians over land conflicted with some 
British subjects' desires for an Illinois colony. Similarly. Illinois 
inhabitants during the French regime found themselves in a bind over 
their desire to increase the French pretence in the territory. The 
general French policy with regards to acquiring lands was to use only 
unclaimed areas or to secure the permission of a given region's 
dominant Indian group. A more rapid expansion of French villages 
and agriculture, however, held out to the French several attractive 
features, although with this expansion would come the risk of 
alienating the Indians through white encroachments on Indian lands. 
The Illinois country, a long journey away from both New Orleans and 
Montreal, was expensive to supply, and some French officials felt that
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a larger French community could render the territory more self- 
sufficient and less of a financial burden to the French empire. Just 
prior to the loss of Illinois to the British, the Ordonnateur of Louisiana, 
Jean Jaques Dabbadie, suggested that Fort de Chartres could only be 
properly and inexpensively maintained if a self-sufficient colony were 
created around it through the increase of the French population, the 
expansion of the region s agriculture, and the greater development of 
crafts there.8 The value of the Illinois country as agricultural district 
and the possibility of its producing foodstuffs for the other French 
North American settlements and forts provided a second form of 
encouragement for expansion. The Illinois country already yielded 
enough grain, meat and other produce to export food to places like the
French post at Natchez.? In 1751. Macarty reported that he felt he*•
could induce the Illinois inhabitants to greatly expand their farming, if 
he could assure them that their produce would be bought by the 
government, and he asserted that the Illinois country could be made 
to feed much of Louisiana.8 Macarty, it seems, envisioned a colony in 
which more inhabitants would be involved in agriculture and fewer in 
the Indian trade. The creation of an agricultural colony, however, held 
the potential to alienate the area's Indians.
The security of French interior possessions also dictated expanded 
Illinois settlements. By 17*46, the white Illinois inhabitants still
numbered only about 1,000. This paucity of settlers worried French*
officials, who saw the small population as a sign of the territory's 
vulnerability. Some French felt that expanding their settlements was
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the only sure means of containing the British in the east. French 
officials in Louisiana might h ive encouraged settlement in the Illinois 
country by granting land to farmers and encouraging agriculture in 
the ways suggested by Macarty. but such steps were never taken. 
Increased settlement could have made the interior more secure 
against the British and their Indian allies, but it also might have 
created tension with France's own Indian allies, making the interior 
less secure. Like the British later, the French in Illinois were caught 
between the benefits of expanded settlement and the need to 
maintain amity with the Indians.
Finally, and most importantly, the French shared their British 
successors' great concern over the cost of maintaining good Indian 
relations. Far from exerting any special influence over the Illinois 
country's Indians, the French had to spend a great amount of wealth 
on presents and services for the Indians and encourage traders to 
keep their prices low. To understand the connection between 
European goods being given or traded to Indians and the politics of 
Indian-white alliances, one must consider the place of these goods in 
Indian life. Richard White, writing on the Indian groups of the Great 
Lakes region, including many of those taking part in events in the 
Illinois country, suggests that European goods possessed meaning for 
the Indians beyond their specific utility as kettles, guns, cloth, etc. For 
the Indians, trade and gift-giving represented the establishment or 
maintenance of social and political relationships. Strangers and 
enemies stole from one another, while allies, fellow villagers, and
kinspeople traded or gave presents. Between groups of Indians 
potentially hostile to one another, gifts and trade created bonds which 
could lead to ailiance and inter-marriage. Within an alliance, village 
or kin group, gifts created social and political relationships by 
establishing obligation and status among the group members. Valued 
goods often did not remain with an individual, ut rather passed to 
others through channels of mutual obligation, reaffirm ing these 
< Migations and the structure of the community or clan as they moved 
along.
When European goods were introduced in considerable amounts 
into Indian societies, they became the preferred merchandize for the 
social and political uses just described. Things like blankets and 
kettles became vital to the maintenance of alliances among Indian 
groups and political relationships within groups and clans. Peace 
between communities and power among individuals now depended 
upon goods which could only be acquired from Europeans. This 
situation left the French with an important role to play. They were to 
act as "fathers" to the Indians by providing them with the means with 
which to maintain their social and political order and by mediating 
between estranged Indian groups. More than trade partners, the 
French represented the first actor in a system of mutual obligations 
which kept the interior stable. More than useful and valued objects, 
European goods were the material components and working parts of 
that system and that stability. 10
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It is difficult to ascertain whether the French fully recognized the 
social and political role played by the merchandize they gave or 
traded to the Indians, but they clearly understood that a failure on 
their part to adequately supply the Indians with European goods 
would disrupt the French-Indian alliances and render the interior a 
much more dangerous place for Frenchmen. The results of a reduction 
in French presents to the Indians and a rise in merchandize prices 
seen in the 1740s in the Great Lakes area serve to demonstrate this 
point. Throughout the first half of the 18th century, the French hold 
on the trade of the interior became increasingly threatened by British 
merchants, whose prices for European merchandize tended to be lower 
than those of the French. British efforts to win Indian trading 
partners were particularly strengthened by the possession of British 
Stroud, inexpensive but well-made cloth which became one of the 
Indians' most sought-after European goods. Realizing that a loss of the 
trade meant the dissolution of their Indian alliances, the French 
authorities countered the British threat by distributing more presents, 
providing the services of blacksmiths and gunsmiths at the posts, and 
even directly subsidizing the trade by taking over several posts and 
maintaining price* offered at those posts at levels competitive with 
those offered by the British, although this meant the French took a 
loss on the trade.*1 As the British-French rivalry in the interior 
continued, the ever-increasing financial burden involved in 
maintaining Indian friendships led to calls for retrenchment among 
the officials of both Canada and Louisiana. In the early 1740s, Indian
O ’
presents from Canada were reduced, while, in an effort to cut the 
Crown's expenses in keeping up the posts, a number of posts were 
leased to individual merchants, who raised prices to exploit their 
monopolies. Furthermore, the outbreak of King George's War (1744- 
1748), with its accompanying British blockade, led to shortages in 
European merchandize and higher prices on those goods which did 
circulate. To the Indians, reduced presents and higher prices 
represented a failure on the .part of the French to live up to the terms 
of their alliance. The French had betrayed the Indians, and this 
betrayal was particularly rankling for the fact that it came at a time 
when the French required their allies to participate in a French war. 
To protest this betrayal, Indians refused to pay the higher prices for 
European goods and robbed and murdered French traders, or else they 
took up trading with the British. This partial disintegration of the 
Indian alliances led the French eventually to return to a policy of 
conciliating the Indians and subsidizing the trade as in previous
years. • 2
What is important to note in the above description of French policy 
is that the French chose the maintenance of their Indian alliances, so 
vital to the security of their North American possessions, over Reeded 
economic retrenchment. The French could not dominate their allies or 
force them to do their bidding. Rather, the alliance forced the French 
to accept the obligations of a father, even when it was highly 
inconvenient for them to do so. The skin and fur trade was required 
to bear the costs of keeping the French posts in the interior and
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maintaining Indian friendships, since French authorities received their
revenue from the licensing fees paid by merchants wishing to trade
with the Indians.13 To remain within their income, then, the French
could not spend more on security than they received from the trade.
Historian Norman Caldwell, writing about the Mississippi valley region
in the decade prior to the Seven Years War. suggests that the revenue
from tiscencing was sufficient to balance spending in normal times but
l.jat situations requiring increased Indian presents could easily result
in expenditures outstripping income.14 The French in the 18th
century were faced with a British rival whose goods were less
expensive than their own and with the reality that upon the
distribution of these goods to the Indians relied the security of their
North American possessions. In this situation, the French were forced
to try to continue meeting their obligations as fathers to the Indians
even when this required them to spend more than the skin and fur
trade, the ostensible reason for them to be in North America in the
first place, was worth to France. As General Gage remarked in 1762:
It is impossible to ascertain what were the Profits and 
Losses upon the French King's own Trade; no doubt that 
the Trade well managed would have produced considerable 
gains; but from the number of Commissaries and Factors 
employed, who have made very large Fortunes for them­
selves; and the immense profusion of Presents made to the 
Indians. I must conclude His Majesty made very little from
His commerce. 15
The correspondence of French officials in Illinois contains many 
illustrations of the problem just described, in 1750, a Wea chief 
named Le Grand Ongles came to Fort de Chartres to warn the French
that the young men of his community were deserting the French
alliance and trading with the British as a result or the high prices of
French goods. He complained that, trading with the French, "it takes a
man's year's hunt to cloth him" and asked for more traders and goods
to be sent to his village. In other words, Le Grand Ongles demanded
that the French officials take action to increase competition for the
trade of his community, which would lower the prices of French
g o o d s . j n 1752, a French official described how DeBertet, a former
commandant at Fort de Chartres, had maintained amity with the
Illinois country Indians by giving "the chiefs the wherewithal to
maintain their prestige in the village, and with those who came to see
them." This official used DeBertet s example as a counterpoint to
Macarty, who was "dreaded by the Indians because he was not as
generous as his predecessors had been.1? indeed, Macarty regretted
the necessity of distributing Indian presents. The Indians esteem
people only in proportion as people give to them," he wrote to his
superior in 1752, or as they profit by them. 1 8 Finally, in the last
*
year of the Seven Years War. the Illinois commandant, an officer 
named DeVilliers, worried that at least fourteen thousand people 
have been offended by the smallness of that succor which I have been 
able to give them. ' 1 9  In the Illinois country, then, as well as in other 
areas of North America, the French found themselves burdened with 
the expensive necessity of acting as fathers to their Indian allies.
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the French in the 
Illinois country prior to British takeover experienced the same basic
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problems that the British came up against after 1765. Like the British 
later, the French never extended their influence to all of the region s 
Indian groups, nor were they able to escape Indian violence. Fr.r from 
being the masters of eitn-.;r the Indians or the land, the Illinois French 
formed an isolated enclave dependent upon the maintenance of amity 
with Indian groups but increasingly threatened by the endeavors of 
British traders, whose cheaper goods, since European merchandize 
acted as the material sign oi friendship with the Indians, disrupted 
not only the trade, but the very security of the French possessions. In 
a sense, French-British imperial rivalry in the interior took the form of 
competition for the friendship of Indian groups. As a consequence, 
Indians could wield a considerable amount of influence. This Indian 
influence, of course, was not*the only kind of power wielded in the 
interior. The French could capitalize on the existence of rivalries 
between Indian groups just as readily as Indians could play the 
French off of the British. As the remarks of Le Grand Ongles 
demonstrate, however, Indians sometimes had the upper hand.
Comparing this picture of the French regime with that offered by 
the British, one is struck by how little the situation in the Illinois 
country actually changed from before to after the Seven Years War. 
Of course, the war gave the British the territory east of the Mississippi 
river and left the French inhabitants who removed to the west bank 
under Spanish, rather than French, imperial authority. But life in the 
Illinois country continued to be dominated by competition between 
groups of Europeans for the trade and friendship of Indians. In a
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sense, the British struggle for empire continued long after 1763 in the 
Illinois country, since the British continued to be confronted by other 
Europeans whose actions tended to disrupt the efforts of British 
traders to win commerce with Indians and of British authorities to win 
influence. Furthermore, the close proximity of the Spanish 
settlements to those of the British and the permeable nature, of the 
Mississippi as an international boundary assured that British control 
over th^ir territory would always be tenuous and difficult to maintain.
In this situation, the Indians continued to wield considerable influence»
over the British in Ultr.ois.
After the Seven Years War, some British felt that the Indians had 
to be made subservient to their new overlords, that their obedience 
rather than their agreement had to be secured. In 1764, writing of 
the as yet unpacified Illinois country. Colonel Henry Bouquet 
remarked:
The dread of English power is in my opinion the sole motive 
capable of making a solid impression in (the Indians') minds, 
they must be convinced with their own eyes, that it is not 
out of necessity, but out of Regard to them, that we offer our 
Alliance, and I doubt whether we shall ever root out the 
French Interest in that Country, till we make our appearance 
in it with a force sufficient to make ourselves respectable, 
and awe both the French and the Savages.20
As already indicated, Britain was never able to place in Illinois a
military force sufficient to "awe" the Indians as per Bouquet's
recommendation, and George Croghan and Edward Cole asserted to the
home government that the British in Illinois did, indeed, face the
necessity of making Indian alliances. The records left by British in the
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Illinois country suggest that some Indians understood well the 
insecurity of the British position and that they played to Britain's need 
to maintain Indian alliances in an effort to make the British behaveI*«*
like better fathers. Furthermore, Indian groups acted similarly 
towards the Spanish, who labored under an identical necessity of 
securing alliances. The same Indian groups, for instance, visited both 
the British and Spanish authorities to ask for presents. George 
Morgan s record of the purchases made by the Crown for Indian 
presents describes visits made by parties of Osage, Iowa, Mascouten 
and Kickapoo, groups which also came to commandant Piernas in 
Spanish Illinois within weeks of his arrival.21 Illinois nation groups 
also appear in records and correspondence as laving received 
presents from both the Spanish and British authorities.22 it iS 
Impossible to determine whether the individual parties of these
Indians were the same when noted by the Spanish and British; they
• •
might have been different deputations acting independently and 
residing in separate villages within a given group. The frequency wi h 
which the names of the same Indian groups appear as having received 
gifts from both the Spanish and British, however, suggests that some 
of these parties were, in fact, the same on both sides of the Mississippi 
or that those who visited the Spanish and British came from the same 
villages. The Indians, then, took advantage of the presence of two 
rival European powers in close proximity to one another by seeking 
desired merchandize from both.
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For British and Spanish officials, the ease with which Indians were 
able to cross the Mississippi's international boundary could take on 
great political importance. European influence with Indians in large 
measure depended upon European control over the merchandize 
Indians needed, since European goods could be used as rewards for 
compliance by Indians or withheld as punishment for disobedience. 
With both the Spanish and the British working to secure alliances in 
the Illinois country, however, Indians who were dissatisfied with one 
group of Europeans could cross the river and seek their necessities 
with the other. Records suggest that the close proximity of the British 
and Spanish territories allowed Indians who were hostile to one of the 
European powers to remain sb by giving them an alternative source of 
needed goods. To take one example, in the autumn of 1767, a party of 
around 120 Missouri Indians came to Fort de Chartres from the west 
side of the Mississippi to proclaim their friendliness towards the 
British and their hope, in the words of the Baynton, Wharton and 
Morgan business journal, of "ratifying the Preliminaries of Trade."
e
They also "beg'd they might be pitied so as to fhelp] them prosecute 
their Winter Hunt."23 For the Indians, the trade in European goods 
represented a larger social and political relationship. As such, the 
party of Missouri, it seems, were offering the Illinois British their 
alliance. If the British approved of such a relationship, they would 
demonstrate their friendship by acting like good fathers and giving 
the Missouri the guns, shot, powder and other items they needed to 
carry out their winter hunt. Cole did, in fact, distribute presents to the
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party, and it seems likely that the Indians' attempt to secure goods 
from the British was aided by the fact that the Missouri came from the 
Spanish side of the river. Such an ally would become valuable in the 
event of an Anglo-Spanish war. The Spanish authorities relations 
with the Missouri were often very troubled. In 1772, commandant 
Piernas described them as ‘ daring and insolent' and blamed their 
behavior on their closeness io the British.2 4  The Spanish feared that 
the British would claim a right to passage on the Missouri river if 
British traders were not kept from trafficking on it, and the amity 
between the British and the Missouri Indians, whose territory was 
adjacent the river,25 must have deepened Spanish anxiety.
The Baynton, Wharton and Morgan journal contains a number of 
entries very similar to that concerning the visit of the Missouri party. 
In December of 1767, for example, a party of Kaskaskia living on the 
west side of the Mississippi came to express their friendship for the
tt
British and ask for European goods to help them in their winter hunt. 
About that time, a group of Osage visited with the same intention.2  ^
These visits, along with others noted in the journals, exhibit a pattern. 
The Indians would declare their loyalty to the British, despite the fact 
that they lived in Spanish territory, and then they would ask for 
presents to help in their hunting. The British, needing Indian allies 
and undoubtedly attracted to alliances with groups residing in their 
rival's territory, would oblige them. The manner in which the Indians 
requested aid suggests that they were keenly aware of the influence 
they could wield over the British. The Spanish, after all, also
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distributed goods. These Indians, believing that it would elicit British 
generosity, offered themselves as possible allies within Spanish 
Illinois.
The Spanish, too, were visited by Indians who resided in their 
imperial rival s territory. In the autumn of 1769, commandant 
Piernas noted visits by parties of Potawatomi. Fox, Piankashaw, 
Kickapoo and Mascouten. groups who resided in the British 
territory.27 j n 1 7 7 7 , the Spanish authorities compiled a list of 
Indians from the British territory who regularly received presents 
from the Spanish. This list included the Potawatomi, Sauk, Fox, and 
several Illinois nation groups. What is important to note about these 
lists is that they suggest the Spanish were allied with some of the 
Indians most troublesome to the British. As previously mentioned, 
General Gage considered the Potawatomi and the Wabash Indians, who 
included the Piankashaw, great obstacles to the exercise of British 
authority in the Illinois country. The availability to these Indians of 
European goods from a source other than the British, it seems, helped 
them to continue their resistance to British power. The Sauk and Fox 
in 1768 were rumored to be preparing for war against the British, but 
the 1777 Spanish list described the Sauk as so friendly that they 
protected and helped French and Spanish hunters on the Mississippi, 
while it described the Fox as unquestionably reliable.2® These good 
relations offered the Spanish possible allies in an Anglo-Spanish 
conflict and allowed the Indians to escape dependence upon the 
British for European goods.
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The Baynton, Wharton and Morgan business journals display 
another method through which some Indian groups were able to 
influence the British to act more generously as fathers. The journal 
recording Edward Cole's Indian affairs account describes the following 
Indian visit in March, 1768:
To the Black Dog a Peoria Chief & twenty Warriors, who 
came to acquaint their Father, that they had been invited 
by the Chipewas, Iawas, & Putewatomis to a Grand Council, 
which was to be held very soon at the head of the Illinois 
River, but they gave for answer, that if they had any business 
with their Nation, they might come to them. Expressed the 
greatest friendship & surety of the earliest intelligence if 
there was danger. They beg'd to be assisted to finish their 
hunt for this season.29
Like the Indian parties described above who came to Cole from the 
west side of the Mississippi, the Peoria visited with the purpose of 
obtaining shot, powder and other supplies they needed for their 
hunting. Although they declared their loyalty and requested these 
supplies in a beseeching manner, the Peoria, in a sense, were 
threatening the British and demanding goods. They informed their 
Father that they had been approached by Indians hostile to the British 
and that, while refusing to go to the council, they had left open the 
possibility of their having relations with these British enemies at a 
later time. In effect, the Peoria reminded the British that their 
alliance was founded upon mutual obligation and that, with so many 
enemies about, the British could ill afford to lose the allies they 
possessed. The Peoria would continue to act as allies, refusing the 
advances of Britain's enemies and watching for danger, if the British
continued to act as proper fathers. Cole, for his part, responded to the 
Peorias' requests with L27 worth of presents. At about the same time 
as the Peoria visit, the journal records the arrival of a group of 
Missouri who had settled with the Peoria on the east side of the 
Mississippi:
they came to take their Father by the hand, assuring 
him they would not listen to the invitation of those 
Indians who are badly disposed, but would continue 
firm to the English, prayed for Assistance to carry them 
to their Hunting Ground.
These Indians, too, had been invited to join groups hostile to the 
British, to repudiate their British alliance. Like the Peoria, the 
Missouri tied their continued amity to the British supplying them with 
goods to use in their hunt. As long as these goods were forthcoming, it 
seems, they would not listen to Britain s enemies. Cole presented this 
party with L36 worth of shot, powder, clothing, rum and other 
merchandize.30 The presence of hostile Indian groups provided the 
British with a constant reminder of the need to secure Indian allies 
and gave the Indians a lever with which to persuade the British to act 
like better fathers.
Historian Arthur Ray, writing of the Hudson Bay Company s Indian 
relations during the time of French-British rivalry prior to the Seven 
Years War, asserts that Indians used the state of competition existing 
between French and British traders to induce these traders to offer
better merchandize at lower prices. The Indians worded their*¥
requests as pleas for kindness, but they were specific about what they 
wanted and often claimed to traders of one nation that the other
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nation's merchants were selling better or cheaper goods. With the 
French and British working to deprive each other of trading partners 
and allies, the Indians found themselves in a position to dictate some 
of the terms of their relations with the Europeans.31 The Illinois 
country after 1765, it seems, provided Indian groups with a similar 
situation. The war had reapportioned the western territory, but 
Illinois, part of the frontier of the Spanish and British possessions, 
remained a battleground for the campaigns of traders and imperial 
powers to secure Indian allies. As such, Indians could keep the 
Europeans acting generously by appealing to their anxiety over the 
close presence of their enemies, both whites and other Indian groups. 
The Indians, it is true, were dependent upon Eu.opean goods, but, 
until a single European power could completely dominate the interior, 
this dependence was balanced by the Europeans' own dependence 
upon Indian allies.
During their decade in the Illinois country, the British in various 
ways attempted to lessen the Indian influence over them and reduce 
the expense involved in meeting the demands of some Indian groups 
for goods. William Johnson's 1764 plan for the Indian department, 
while it recognized the need to provide the Indians with goods, 
represented an attempt to systematize Indian relations in such a ws- 
that the expenses of the Indian department could be kept within a 
defined budget. In the British colonies prior to and during the Seven 
Years War. a variety of agencies had distributed Indian presents: 
individual colonists such as traders, the British government and
military, the colonial administrations. Johnson tried to rationalize 
Indian relations and eliminate wasteful expenditure.32 for his 
northern department, he projected that a little less than 1 11,000 
would be raised annually through the plan s new duties on the pelt
trade. With L4.000 alloted for An annual present for the Hattons in 
the Northern District, in addition to salaries and other expenses, the 
department would spend about as much as it received from she tan.£3 
This new tax, of course, was never levied, but even with the tax, 
additional presents of any substantial amount would have taken the 
department beyond its income. Johnson, it seems, hoped that the 
annual presents would be enough to satisfy the Indians and that she 
other aspects of his plan would lead to a state of peace and stability iB 
which additional gifts would not be required lie hoped that, if l ip  
British kept to the formula of Ms program, it would control eapeppes 
while helping the British to control the interior.
In addition to Johnson s attempt to regularize and control the met 
of Indian :f*latid(is in the Wen. in general, Illinois country nffirUBi 
worked to blunt the Indian*' demands for good*. In 1761, Captain 
Forbes, the commander at Fort de Char tree, complained to gpnorgl 
Gage:
I have for some time observed that the more Presents 
(the Indians] receive, the oftner they Return, and are less 
contented; and that their chief dependence rests moreupon 
his Majesty's Bounty than their own Industry; for while they 
are provided with necessary*, and Provisions, they never 
move from their village, but begging and hanging upon the 
Idhjhdantt. which gives them such a habit of Idiphaw 
(partteutarty thefour Tribes in tMs District) that Ifeay arc
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by constant use or Spiritous Liquors become Effeminate and 
Debilitated: so much that nothing can be apprehended, from 
such a Dastardly Race of Cowards, who impute, the Bounty 
they receive, proceeds from fear not from Love.
Edward Cole's generosity probably elicited this complaint, and Forbes
suggested that gift-giving be restricted and expressed his support for 
the idea of distributing only annual presents.34 Presumably, this 
practice would alter the way in which the Indians viewed the British 
gifts, making them see that the British gave out of regard for the 
Indians, rather than obligation to them. Forbes successor, Colonel 
Wilkins, attempted a similar feat. In the autumn of 1768, George
Morgan wrote to John Baynton that Wilkins, having taken over the 
management of Indian affairs from the newly-unemployed Cole, had 
promised to distribute presents to the Indians according to the 
quantity of skins and furs they brought in for trade, a policy of which 
Morgan greatly approved.35 Rather than a Father's obligation, gifts 
would become a reward for services rendered. Presents would be 
distributed in proportion to how much the recipients profited the 
British, so a balance would be struck between the cost of maihttiftini 
Indian alliances and the commerial benefits of those alliances, while 
the Briaish would be able to dictate the terms of their relationships 
with the indiaa*.
None of these attempts to change the nature of Indian relations so 
as to lessen British dependence upon expensive gift-giving succeeded 
in the Illinois country As already discussed, Edward Cole found it 
necessary to distribute presents in amounts which far outstripped 
Johnson s initial eapeetations, m d the atiddie path laid down in the
1764 program between economy and successful Indian relations 
proved unviable. Furthermore. Forbes and Wilkins' subsequent 
attempts to change the relationship whereby the Indians viewed gifts 
as the British obligation to them also failed. The Baynton, Wharton 
and Morgan records show that, even after Cole's departure in 1768, 
the Illinois British gave presents on a variety of occasions and more 
frequently than once a year, and, although Wilkins reduced the 
expense of gift-giving by relying on presents of cheap alcohol, he was 
unable to follow through, it seems, on his promise to give only in 
proportion with the quantity of pelts brought in by the Indians,36 In 
1772, for example. Wilkins met with a party of 60 Kickapoo from a 
group who had been movitj§.about the immediate area of the Illinois 
villages and threatening whites who tried to go out to gather their 
livestock. Richard Winston, writing to Philadelphia, described the 
Kickapoo as coming "not with a good Grace, but Wilkins gave then 
valuable presents, anyway.37 That Wilkins could reduce the 
magnitude and quality of British gifts without a commensurate 
increase in Indian violence against the British suggests that the ability 
of the Indian groups to influence the terms of their British relations 
lessened over time. By the opening of the American Revolution, 
however, the British in Illinois had not escaped the necessity of giving 
frequent gifts, nor changed the relationship whereby the Indians were 
able to demand them.
In many cases, it was the Indians who dictated the nature of 
Indian-white relations in the Illinois country, both prior to and 
following the Seven Years War. Certainly, the Indians came to need 
the Europeans. The stability within their communities and the 
alliances between groups depended upon European merchandize, since 
it functioned in gift-giving and trade as the material sign of political 
and social relationships. During both the French and British regimes, 
however, certain Indian groups were able to manipulate the 
Europeans in order to obtain needed goods as readily as the Europeans 
were able to use those goods to influence the Indians. The Illinois 
country provided a situation in which different groups of white men 
competed for Indian allies. In this situation, Indians could make 
demands upon the Europeans and influence the nature of their 
relations with the whites, since there always existed the possibility 
that a European's allies could go over to his enemies, both rival 
Europeans and hostile Indians. Statements like those of Colonel 
Bouquet and Captain Forbes suggest that some British understood well 
the influence Indians could wield over the British in the interior and 
that they resented it. In the Illinois country, the British attempted to 
break this influence by altering the meaning of the gifts they gave to 
the Indians. They tried to change the gifts from an obligation the 
British owed to their allies to a reward for services rendered the 
British by the Indians. Or else, they thought to deemphasize the role 
of Indian presents by distributing them only once a year, which 
presumably would teach the Indians not to expect or demand more
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frequent gifts and. in this way, alter the terms of British-Indian 
relations to the whites benefit. The British, however, failed to change 
the Indians' conception of gift-giving and, like the French before them, 
were never able to completely dominate the territory's Indians. The 
British secured some Indian alliances, and they never faced a 
concerted effort on the part of Indian groups to drive them from the 
region, but they continued to labor under the necessity of behaving 
like fathers, and certain Indian groups continued to exert great 
influence over the terms of their British relations. While the Indian 
goups of the Illinois country were forced to live with the British, the 
British never fully controlled the Indians.
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C O N C L U S IO N
After the British victories against the French in the Seven Years 
War and the Indian confederation of Pontiac's uprising, British 
imperial authorities attempted to impose upon the Illinois country an 
order which, to their minds, would secure the full realization of their 
victories. The imperial efforts involved two related goals. First, the 
Illinois country would be made to profit the Empire through the trade 
in skins and furs. Under the imperial program of management, this 
goal would be achieved by limiting British settlement in the region, 
thereby reserving the territory for pelt traders, and by establishing 
regulations which would ensure that the profits of the trade remained 
in the Empire. Second. British officials would keep the territory 
peaceful and securely under British authority by fostering amicable 
relations with its various groups of Indians. The limits on settlement 
would serve this goal by allowing the British to avoid disruptions with 
the Indians over white encroachments on Indian lands, while imperial 
trade regulations would allow British officials to oversee the 
commerce so as to ensure that traders would not alienate Indians by 
cheating them. The imperial program would justify Britain's conquest 
of the Illinois country by making it a secure possession and an 
economic asset to the Empire.
The Illinois country, however, confronted the imperial program 
with great obstacles. British officials attempted to enforce the
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imperial trade policies, but the regulations proved ill-fitted to 
conditions in the territory. Europeans and Indians in British Illinois, 
for instance, carried on much of their trade at the Indians' villages, 
rather than at the posts as demanded under the imperial rules. 
Traders from the Spanish side of the Mississippi river invaded the 
British territory in search of pelts, while many of the French traders 
still residing in British Illinois continued their accustomed practice of 
procuring skins and furs at Indian villages. Most of the pelts secured 
through this trade passed to New Orleans and then to France or Spain, 
rather than to a British port. British traders like George Morgan, for 
their part, failed to dominate the trade, and this failure led them 
adopt practices which sometimes contravened the imperial 
regulations, such as when Morgan attempted to supply traders from 
the Spanish territory with British goods. Rather than creating a 
system whereby both the British empire and traders in Illinois could 
benefit from the commerce, the imperial trade regulations set British 
authorities and traders at odds with one another. The Illinois country 
could not be made to fit the imperial program, while the efforts of 
British officials to enforce the regulations hindered the attempts of 
traders to secure personal profits.
Indian relations confronted the British with a similar predicament 
in the Illinois country. The peace and security of the territory 
demanded that the British maiintain alliances with at least some of the 
region's Indian groups. British authorities were able to do this, and a 
major Indian war like Pontiac’s uprising did not break out. The cost of
maintaining these Indian alliances, however, threatened to be more 
than the territory was worth to Great Britain. The presence or the 
Spanish settlements just across the river and of Indian enemies 
throughout the region reinforced the British need for allies and left 
open the possibility that these Indian groups, if dissatisfied with the 
British, could go over to Britain's enemies. In this situation, some 
Indian groups were able to capitalize on British insecurity and 
demand greater presents and aid than the British authorities might 
otherwise have been willing to provide. The British in Illinois 
repeatedly attempted to weaken Indian influence by changing the 
nature of the role gifts played in white-Indian relations, but the need 
to secure alliances was always greater than the need to alter the 
power relationship, and British authorities continued to give gifts on 
the Indians' terms. In this manner, certain Indian groups retained a 
measure of influence over the terms of their relations with the British.
Stalemate characterized the Illinois country in the years between 
the end of the Seven Years War and the outbreak of the American 
Revolution: stalemate between the policies of imperial authorities and 
the desires individual British subjects in Illinois, between British 
traders like George Morgan and their French competitors, between 
British officials trying to reduce expenses and Indian groups trying to 
gain from their British relations Where the French had failed to halt 
the British conquest of North America in the Seven Years War, the 
actions of French traders, Indian groups, and the British, themselves,
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stalled the realization of the benefits of that conquest in the Illinois 
country.
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